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Although previously considered rare, over three hundred startups have reached 
valuations over a billion dollars. Thousands of smaller startups aim to follow in their 
paths. Despite the enormous social and economic impact of venture-backed startups, 
their internal governance receives scant scholarly attention. Longstanding theories of 
corporate ownership and governance do not capture the special features of startups. 
They can grow large with ownership shared by diverse participants, and they face 
issues that do not fit the dominant principal-agent paradigm of public corporations or 
the classic narrative of controlling shareholders in closely held corporations. 
This Article offers an original, comprehensive framework for understanding the 
unique combination of governance issues in startup companies over their life cycles. 
It shows that venture-backed startups involve heterogeneous shareholders in 
overlapping governance roles that give rise to vertical and horizontal tensions 
between founders, investors, executives, and employees. These tensions tend to 
multiply as the company matures and increases the number of participants with 
varied interests and claims. This framework of startup governance offers new insight 
into issues of current debate, including monitoring failures by startup boards and late-
stage governance complexity, and suggests that more attention should be paid to how 
corporate law principles apply in the startup context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world’s largest companies in 2019 by market capitalization—Apple, 
Alphabet, Microsoft, and Amazon—all began as venture-backed startups.1 
They defied existing theory by growing to significant size with ownership 
shared between founders, investors, executives, and employees.2 In the years 
 
1 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2017 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N YEARBOOK 9 
[hereinafter NVCA YEARBOOK], https://nvca.org/blog/nvca-2017-yearbook-go-resource-venture-
ecosystem [https://perma.cc/3HQ7-DR6Q]; Stephen Grocer, Biggest Public Company? Microsoft. 
Wait, Apple Again. Amazon? No, Back to Microsoft., N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/05/business/dealbook/apple-amazon-microsoft-market-
value.html [https://perma.cc/KD2A-KS24]. This Article focuses on innovative, venture-backed 
startups, defined in Section I.A, infra. 
2 See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 40-44 (1996) (observing the 
“nearly complete absence of large firms in which ownership is shared among two or more different 
types of patrons, such as customers and suppliers or investors and workers” and theorizing the high 
cost of collective decisionmaking that would result from having different types of owners). 
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since these trailblazing startups crossed over into public company status, 
record-breaking amounts of capital have flowed into new private companies.3 
Over three hundred “unicorn” startups have reached private valuations 
described as one billion dollars or more.4 Many of these companies have also 
reached the ten-year mark and face critical inflection points in their life 
cycles.5 Thousands of other startups are following on their heels or hope to 
do so. Our economy and society are increasingly dominated by companies 
that start in the proverbial garage or dorm room and, for a critical period, 
operate with a venture-capital style of ownership and governance. 
Corporate law and theory have not kept pace in giving due attention to 
this development and adapting general principles to fit the special features of 
startups.6 Courts apply traditional contract strictures to the preferred stock 
that venture capitalists hold not as public company debt, but rather as a stake 
in a distinctive system of shared equity and governance.7 Recent case law 
requires startup directors to maximize value for common shareholders, 
without recognizing that in startups these shareholders do not have a 
monolithic set of interests and do not represent the firm value.8 
Corporate law literature remains similarly rooted in traditional paradigms 
of public and closely held corporations that do not map on well to startups. 
Landmark works on the separation of ownership and control in public 
 
3 See Begum Erdogan et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow: Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, 
MCKINSEY (May 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/grow-
fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-private [https://perma.cc/S8CU-HGQM] (noting 
that the influx of capital to private companies tripled from $26.5 billion to $75.3 billion between 
2013 and 2015). 
4 Venture capitalist Aileen Lee coined the term “unicorn” in 2013 to capture the elusive and 
rare nature of mega-hit ventures in a fund that are worth a billion dollars or more. Aileen Lee, 
Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club [https://perma.cc/SP4S-4SXA]. 
In just several years, the list of unicorns rose to over three hundred private technology companies. 
The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies 
[https://perma.cc/DS5A-ET7T] (last visited Aug. 11, 2019). 
5 See Alfred Lee, Delayed IPOs Undercut Startup Employee Options, THE INFO. (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/delayed-ipos-undercut-startup-employee-options 
[https://perma.cc/AD59-EPBD] (noting that fifty-two unicorns hit the ten-year mark by 2018 
and that more would follow in 2019). Notable examples in this batch of unicorns include Airbnb, 
Uber, Pinterest, Palantir, and SpaceX—some of which have since transitioned to public company 
status. Id. 
6 See Robert P. Bartlett & Eric Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, in 1 THE HANDBOOK 
OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177, 185-86 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & 
Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017) (“Th[e] increasing concentration of economic value in private 
companies poses something of a challenge for corporate governance scholars, both empirically and 
theoretically . . . . To the extent this trend continues, the study of governance in privately held firms 
is likely to become more critical to important policy debates.”). 
7 See infra subsection II.A.2.b. 
8 See infra Section III.B. 
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corporations and a principal-agent theory of the firm have oriented the field 
to view reducing managerial agency costs “as the essential function of 
corporate law.”9 A smaller body of work on controlled and closely held 
corporations has, by contrast, highlighted that these corporations do not share 
the hallmark feature of widely dispersed shareholders and instead face the 
potential problem of minority shareholder oppression.10 
Amid this dichotomous approach to corporations,11 a separate body of 
venture capital and entrepreneurship literature has emerged to examine 
specific governance issues in startups. Key work in this field includes, for 
example, the study of venture capital financing12 and the use of preferred 
stock.13 Some scholars have recently begun studying unicorns, the largest 
startups by valuation, and have advocated for increasing disclosures and 
strengthening mechanisms that impose discipline on founders.14 Yet, despite 
 
9 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and 
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 769 (2017); see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2-4 (1932) (identifying the 
separation of ownership and control in corporations with dispersed share ownership as a key 
governance issue); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976) (theorizing that 
the misalignment between shareholders and managers gives rise to agency costs). 
10 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1279-80 (2017); see generally Benjamin Means, A Contractual 
Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010); Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close 
Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293 (2004). 
11 Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 37 (2006) [hereinafter Bartlett, False Dichotomy] (“On one side of the 
dichotomy rests the publicly held corporation suffering from a significant conflict of interest 
between its managers and dispersed shareholders; on the other side, the closely held corporation 
plagued by intershareholder conflict.”). 
12 See, e.g., Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 61-64 (examining horizontal issues 
between venture capital investors); William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred 
Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 914-16, 939-44 (2002) (discussing why venture 
capitalists use preferred stock and how they contract for protections from downside failure); Ronald 
J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1067, 1082 (2003) (discussing how venture capital contracts respond to agency costs between 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 315, 316-20 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Exit Structure] (examining potential conflicts 
between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs regarding exit). 
13 The literature on the conflict between the preferred and common shareholders in startups 
includes: Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 255 (2015) [hereinafter Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, 
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006); Charles R. 
Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1163 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Response, Poor Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025 (2013). 
14 See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. 583, 583 (2016) (arguing “for enhanced disclosure requirements that will alleviate the risks of 
unicorns without restraining their innovation”); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 
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growing influence and concern, no article has provided a full account of the 
unique features of startups and their governance. 
This Article takes aim at that goal. With their focus on technology and 
innovation, and their correspondingly high levels of risk and emphasis on 
growth, startups are different from both public corporations and traditional 
closely held corporations. As a result, their governance is also different. This 
Article provides an in-depth, holistic analysis of the governance problems in 
venture-backed startup companies that exist through various stages of their 
life cycles. Specifically, it offers a framework showing that startups involve 
heterogeneous shareholders in overlapping governance roles that give rise to 
vertical and horizontal tensions between founders, investors, executives, and 
employees. These tensions tend to multiply as a company matures and 
increases the number of participants with varied interests and claims. 
This original account of startup governance shares features with 
traditional models but also differs in significant ways that have wide-ranging 
implications for corporate law and theory. Prevailing accounts, whether 
focused on public corporations and their shareholder-manager conflicts, or 
closely held corporations and their issues of controlling shareholder 
opportunism, present the corporation in static terms as facing one essential 
governance issue that is either vertical or horizontal in nature.15 Corporate 
law literature has also often characterized shareholders as homogeneous in 
their interests and has excluded employees from analysis, recognizing their 
relevance to the corporation in only contractual terms.16 
 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 169 (2017) (arguing that “recent market trends and deregulatory reforms 
have weakened or eliminated the principal mechanisms that imposed discipline on start-up company 
founders”). 
15 One notable exception is work by Robert Bartlett that provides a dynamic account showing 
that the staged and syndicated financing that venture capitalists (VCs) use to constrain shareholder-
manager agency costs can give rise to a new dimension of horizontal conflict among preferred 
shareholders in startups. See Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 108-14. This Article builds on 
this insight and is the first to provide a comprehensive dynamic account of the multiple vertical and 
horizontal tensions in startups and argue, in contrast to Bartlett, that startups have unique 
governance features and do not present the same agency problems and investment risks as all other 
firms. See id. at 37-40 (asserting that “all firms—public and private—often face the same agency 
problems” and “all firms—public and private—frequently face the same structural investment 
risks”). 
16 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (providing a contractarian theory of corporate law and 
characterizing employees as creditors protected by contract and external regulation); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 
(2001) (“[The] emerging consensus [is] that ultimate control over the corporation should rest with 
the shareholder class; . . . [and] other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers, should have their interests protected by contractual and regulatory means 
rather than through participation in corporate governance.”); Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation 
and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589, 591-92 (1993) (“Shareholders have highly 
homogeneous interests with respect to most corporate decisions: they all basically want to maximize 
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This approach is a poor fit for startups. Participants in startups often 
occupy overlapping and shifting roles. For example, a venture capital (VC) 
firm is a shareholder and may additionally hold a designated seat on the 
board. This complicates conventional applications of principal-agent theory 
as participants may have a dual status as both principal in one context and 
agent in another. 
In addition, startup shareholders are heterogeneous. In light of extreme 
levels of uncertainty and asymmetric information, startups typically issue 
common stock to founders and raise money from investors by issuing rounds 
of convertible preferred stock with varying terms and layered contractual 
rights.17 This capital structure creates significant divergences in preferences 
among shareholders. Furthermore, employees make essential investments of 
human capital and hold common equity or options.18 In many instances the 
interests of founders and executives align with those of employees, but in 
some situations they diverge because of differences in control, potential deal 
payouts, and post-exit opportunities. Conflicts therefore arise not only 
between preferred shareholders, and between preferred and common 
shareholders, but also between common shareholders—a point that even 
scholars focused on startups have generally left unexplored.19 
Setting out the full picture of vertical and horizontal tensions highlights 
the distinctiveness of startups and also uncovers an important pattern: The 
governance tensions tend to multiply as the startup business evolves and the 
complexity of its capital structure grows. Unlike public companies and other 
closely held corporations, which do not display predictable or linear patterns 
 
the net present value of future distributions.”); but see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (including employees in the 
“corporate ‘team’”); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 
283-88 (1998) (critiquing the exclusion of workers from corporate law doctrine); Brett H. 
McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 334, 334-37 (2008) (arguing for “employee primacy” in corporate governance). 
17 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
18 Scholars have largely overlooked the role of non-founder employees in startup governance. 
For an excellent essay that considers the vulnerability of startup employees to risk in mature 
startups, see Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & The Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 613 (2017). Other startup employee-related literature has primarily focused on 
theorizing stock options and analyzing legal issues such as taxation. See Victor Fleischer, Taxing 
Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 75-100 (2011) (arguing for reform to the preferential tax 
treatment of founders’ stock); Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1901, 1924-40 (2001) (offering an explanation for the popularity of stock options as part 
of compensation packages). 
19 As Section II.A explains, in startups this divergence between common shareholders typically 
occurs between the management and employees. Scholars are beginning to explore interinvestor 
conflicts in public companies that might offer a parallel. See Bartlett & Talley, supra note 6, at 8 
(“[T]he nature of governance disputes within public companies has itself begun to migrate in recent 
years to ‘horizontal’ disputes between shareholders (e.g., activists versus long-term investors).”). 
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of governance change, venture-backed startups that survive foreseeably face 
increasing potential conflicts. 
While it may seem intuitive that startups increase in governance 
complexity as they continue to operate, this account is missing from the 
existing literature. Because startups are often unprofitable for long periods 
while they develop innovative products or services, they usually raise outside 
investment and continue to do so to fuel growth.20 Each round of financing 
may bring investors with different terms and interests into the capital 
structure, adding to potential governance conflicts.21 Further, employees are 
typically hired on an ongoing and increasing basis, and become staggered in 
their option vesting schedules and exercise prices. Thus, as a startup company 
matures, it expands the number of participants with varied interests and 
claims affecting its governance structure.22 
These central contributions of the Article help elucidate vexing issues of 
current debate and open future directions for corporate law. Part I discusses 
the distinctiveness of startups and their paradigmatic life cycle. It sets out 
legal boundaries and definitions, and identifies two dimensions of the startup 
life cycle that drive governance issues: the evolving nature of the business and 
capital structure. Part II provides a holistic analytical framework of the 
recurring issues of startup governance, both vertical (such as between the 
board and founders) and horizontal conflicts (such as between shareholders). 
It includes all startup participants and shows how they have diverging 
interests and might be involved in more than one type of governance issue, 
serving overlapping roles. Furthermore, it observes that governance issues 
tend to increase over time because of the evolving stage of business and 
increased complexity of the capital structure. 
Part III explores how these observations help to explain current 
developments and illuminate implications for lawmakers. First, with scandals 
at companies such as Uber and Theranos making headline news, recent 
accounts of startups have bemoaned unaccountable companies with large 
social footprints and compliance failures.23 This Article’s framework helps 
show how a startup’s evolving governance structure pushes toward 
prioritizing growth and puts key participants in overlapping roles, which can 
result in conflicts of interest and weaken oversight. This explanation solves a 
puzzle left open by existing literature, which assumes that VCs will serve as 
strong monitors. Further, it reveals cause for concern that likely cannot be 
solved with the standard corporate governance proposal for greater board 
 
20 See infra Part I. 
21 See infra Section II.A. 
22 See infra Section II.B. 
23 See infra subsection III.A.1. 
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independence. Startup governance may insufficiently constrain the social 
costs created by growing, innovative companies. 
Second, the law and finance literature has examined various reasons for 
companies to go public but has overlooked what the framework offered here 
posits—complex governance dynamics in the extreme late stage of the startup 
life cycle.24 Staying private with an increasingly diverse group of shareholders 
involves significant difficulty and cost in negotiating new rounds of financing, 
managing information flows, and meeting the liquidity needs of not just early 
investors but also large numbers of employees who constitute a crucial part 
of the workforce. This closer examination of the dynamics of startups in the 
extreme late stage provides a contemporary, governance-based account 
explaining why liquidity is so critical and why companies like Spotify and 
Slack go public even when private capital is available. Going public can enable 
companies to simplify their governance complexity while providing liquidity. 
Third, Part III suggests that corporate law should adapt in its application 
to startups in recognition of their distinctive features. Corporate law has 
largely developed to deal with the classic shareholder–manager and 
controlling–minority shareholder conflicts arising in public and traditional 
closely held corporations. Courts have applied these conventional frames of 
reference in cases involving startups, treating preferred shareholders as 
creditors with respect to their contractual preferences and characterizing 
common shareholders as the residual claimants of the corporation. A key 
example of this approach arises with fiduciary duty doctrine that is at the 
heart of corporate law. The last section examines In re Trados,25 Delaware’s 
most notable fiduciary duty case involving a startup, and shows how the court 
overlooks the heightened need of heterogeneous shareholders to resolve 
complex governance issues by contract and a board with constituency 
directors that is renegotiated over time.26 A better approach would recognize 
the corporation itself as the beneficiary of the fiduciary duties, representing 
the firm value and the interests of all startup participants. 
I. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF STARTUPS AND THEIR LIFE CYCLE 
To start at the beginning of understanding startup governance is to 
recognize that despite widespread reference to companies by the moniker of 
“startup” and recognition of their economic importance,27 the law does not 
 
24 See infra subsection III.A.2. 
25 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
26 See infra Section III.B. 
27 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 12, at 1068 (noting that startup companies and the venture capital 
market are “among the crown jewels of the American economy”); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the 
Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 314-15 (2013) [hereinafter 
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create such a category. This Part begins with definitional background and 
then sets out the unique combination of business and finance features in 
innovative venture-backed startups, which give rise to several recurring 
fundamental governance issues. 
A. Legal Boundaries and Definitions 
The law does surprisingly little to formally define startups or mandate 
their governance. Federal securities law draws a line between “public” and 
“private” corporations.28 A company becomes “public” by making a public 
offering of securities, listing securities on a national securities exchange, or 
by reaching a certain asset size and number of shareholders of record.29 Once 
a company is public, it is subject to a wide variety of governance requirements 
provided by federal statutes and by the securities exchange on which the 
company’s stock is traded.30 For example, a public corporation’s board must 
have a majority of independent directors and must give shareholders a non-
binding “say-on-pay” vote on executive compensation.31 
If a company does not become public by one of the established paths, it is 
“private.”32 Some private corporations are referred to as “closely held” or 
 
Sepe, Constituency Directors] (noting that venture-backed startups “are growing exponentially in 
importance in the U.S. economy”). 
28 A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing 
Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2013). Venture-backed startups 
typically organize as corporations. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1738 (1994) (“In Silicon Valley, notwithstanding the concomitant loss of tax 
benefits, a substantial number of new ventures are carried out by newly-formed corporations.”); 
Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 
137 (2003) (“A typical start-up is organized as a corporation under state law, which means that it is 
treated as a separate entity from its owners for tax purposes.”); Gregg Polsky, Explaining Choice-of-
Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 411 (2019) (noting lawyers who 
advise startups “stubbornly prefer C corporations”). 
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a), 78o(d) (2018); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 351 (2013) 
(noting the ways a company may become public). Congress raised the Exchange Act’s section 12(g) 
threshold in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, triggering public reporting 
obligations when a company has total assets exceeding $10 million and 2,000 or more shareholders 
of record, of which no greater than 499 are unaccredited investors. Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012). 
30 Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29, at 381-83 (discussing corporate governance 
requirements on public companies); see, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1453 (1997) (discussing the role of securities exchanges). 
31 Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2182-94 (2004); 
Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 731, 752-54 (2013) [hereinafter Fisch, Delaware]. 
32 To maintain this status, companies issue their securities in private placements conforming 
to the rules for exemptions from registration requirements. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: THE ESSENTIALS 297-98 (2008). 
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“close,” and are generally partnership-like businesses involving family or 
personal ties.33 The Internal Revenue Service defines a closely held 
corporation as having more than half of the value of its outstanding stock 
owned by five or fewer individuals.34 
Common usage often refers to startups with their own title or the broader 
term “private” rather than “closely held,” suggesting that startups connote 
different characteristics.35 Startups are typically started by entrepreneurs and 
backed by outside investment with the goal of developing an innovative 
product or service, creating high growth, and exiting through a trade sale of 
the company or initial public offering (IPO).36 Unlike traditional closely held 
corporations, startups are aimed at eventually being acquired by another 
corporation or transforming to a public corporation—their existence in 
startup form is understood to be ephemeral like a caterpillar in its chrysalis. 
After an initial seed stage, startups often have more than a small handful 
of shareholders, with the numbers increasing as the company raises capital 
from syndicates of investors, including VCs, and grants restricted stock and 
stock options to employees which vest over the course of employment.37 Like 
traditional closely held corporations, startups have stock that is not publicly 
 
33 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets 
and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999); see also Benjamin 
Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2013) 
(highlighting the “distinctive features” of family businesses, which constitute a “vital part of the 
[United States] economy”). 
34 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 542, CORPORATIONS 3 
(Feb. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDY5-FPEJ]. 
35 See, e.g., Telecom-SNI Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. Sorrento Networks, Inc., No. Civ.A. 19038-NC, 2001 
WL 1117505, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2001) (“Sorrento-California, as a startup corporation with no 
immediate prospects of profitability, required constant and significant cash infusions to sustain it 
until an initial public offering (‘IPO’) could be accomplished.”); JOHN B. VINTURELLA & SUZANNE 
M. ERICKSON, RAISING ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITAL 33 (2d ed. 2013) (distinguishing the “closely 
held” corporation from the “private” corporation by the number of shareholders and stating that 
“[a] start-up company with high growth aspirations will typically go through a period as a private 
corporation”). 
36 See, e.g., SCOTT KUPOR, SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND HOW 
TO GET IT 2, 21, 27 (2019) (noting that “tech startups are basically innovative product or service 
companies” and that taking VC financing affects their governance and leads to exit through trade 
sale, IPO, or bankruptcy); Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
289, 289 (1999) (describing a “prototypical start-up” as comprising a founder with an idea and 
outside investment from venture capital). Exits through trade sales greatly outnumber exits 
through IPOs. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2018 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N 
YEARBOOK. 29-31, https://nvca.org/no-access/download-id/67488 [https://perma.cc/38UY-LUEH] 
(providing historic data on U.S. venture-backed exit activity, including 2017 data indicating 750 
acquisitions versus 59 IPOs). 
37 Startups typically manage the number of their holders of record to maintain private status, 
but the numbers may be significantly greater than the definition of “closely held” provided by the 
IRS. See Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 191-93 (2012); 
cf. supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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traded.38 But even in this regard, startups are different in that outside demand 
for the high-growth asset class exists and startups may facilitate partial 
liquidity events.39 This Article focuses on these companies—innovative, 
venture-backed startups and their distinctive governance features.40 
In short, corporate and securities laws do not define or provide special 
rules for startups. From a legal perspective, startups simply represent part of 
the universe of private companies, subject to general principles of corporate 
law but otherwise free to privately order their affairs.41 It is therefore the 
nature of the startup business and its life cycle that significantly drive 
governance arrangements and conflicts. 
B. Two Dimensions of the Startup Life Cycle 
Startups evolve in predictable ways across two dimensions that ultimately 
affect their governance. The first is the nature of the startup business, which 
progresses through stages of maturity. The second is the complexity of the 
capital structure, which increases with additional rounds of financing that are 
required to build and grow the company. Each of these dimensions underlies 
the framework of startup governance that this Article offers. 
1. The Nature of the Business 
Although any particular company’s trajectory may involve fits and starts, 
bumps and detours, in the larger picture of startups there are recognizable 
 
38 See DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, 1 THE LAW OF CLOSELY HELD 
CORPORATIONS § 1.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2017 ed.) (“A closely held corporation can be 
generally defined as a corporation whose stock is not publicly traded on an established market.”). 
39 For discussions of regulatory and technological changes that have facilitated liquidity and 
capital formation in startups outside of exchange listings and public offerings, see, for example, 
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29; Pollman, Information Issues, supra note 37; Robert B. 
Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial 
Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013). 
40 Silicon Valley is famous for producing startups, but the framework offered here is not 
specific to any geographic location. Rather, the governance issues arise from the structures typically 
used by VCs, such as staged financing and preferred stock, and the common practice of granting 
stock options to employees, which together combine to form a structure that has varied participants 
and interests aimed at growth and exit. 
41 State corporate law is generally enabling in nature. See Fisch, Delaware, supra note 31, at 742 
(“[T]he structure of Delaware’s corporate law is largely enabling rather than mandatory.”); see also 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1481 (1989) 
(“Delaware is usually taken as the apotheosis of enabling states.”). 
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and predictable patterns. Startups famously fail at high rates.42 Those that 
succeed generally proceed through well-established business phases.43 
Early-stage startups are highly entrepreneurial and focused on innovation 
and technology. Startups are typically founded or cofounded by 
entrepreneurs who have an invention, technological idea, or discovery, and a 
desire to pursue commercial development.44 Cofounders Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin started in their Stanford dorm rooms by building an internet 
search engine that they brought to market as Google.45 The “two Steves”—
Jobs and Wozniak—started by building a computer circuit board, Apple I, and 
selling Jobs’ VW microbus and Wozniak’s calculator to begin funding its 
production.46 Companies that are started to pursue existing business models 
based on known products or services are replicative and not typically referred 
 
42 See Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190 
[https://perma.cc/7QZZ-LLQP] (finding that “about 60% of startups survive to age three and 
roughly 35% survive to age 10”); Mary Jo White, Chair, Keynote Address at the  
SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31,  
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SQ2-DGVY] (noting that nine out of ten startups fail and seventy percent 
of failed startups die within twenty months after their last financing, having raised an average 
of $11 million). 
43 Researchers have coined various terms and framed different numbers of phases, but 
generally track the discussion offered in this section. See, e.g., NOAM WASSERMAN, THE 
FOUNDER’S DILEMMAS: ANTICIPATING AND AVOIDING THE PITFALLS THAT CAN SINK A 
STARTUP 206-07 & n.* (2012) (identifying the stages as startup, transitional, and mature, and 
noting that “different functions within startups may go through them at different rates”); Max 
Marmer et al., Startup Genome Report Extra on Premature Scaling 14 (Mar. 2012), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/startupcompass-public/StartupGenomeReport2_Why_Startups_Fail
_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6HS-PK9Q] (gathering data from over 3,200 startups and identifying 
six stages: “Discovery, Validation, Efficiency, Scale, Sustain, and Conservation”). 
44 See, e.g., DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEUR 2 (2014) (identifying 
“invention” and “entrepreneurship” as the early stages of startup formation). 
45 From the Garage to the Googleplex, GOOGLE, https://about.google/our-story [https://
perma.cc/CB7B-HM7Q]. 
46 Steve Jobs: An Extraordinary Career, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/197538 [https://perma.cc/D3MS-AXRG]. 
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to as startups.47 By their nature, startups pursue innovation—“something new 
that is introduced to the marketplace.”48 
The key early stage question is: Can we make a product or service that 
people want?49 The nature of this challenge is typically both technological 
and operational because of engineering or scientific challenges involved in 
developing innovative technology and the need to raise money to fund this 
work.50 Most founders do not have sufficient funds to bring an innovative 
product or service to market and the business may not be profitable for long 
periods of time.51 Founders therefore usually look to friends and family, angel 
investors, and VCs to finance the early and most uncertain stages of the 
startup.52 The company’s board, typically established in earnest upon the 
raising of a round of financing, is in a highly managerial phase—helping the 
 
47 See SPULBER, supra note 44, at 2 (“Innovative entrepreneurs differ from replicative 
entrepreneurs who imitate or purchase existing business models. The innovative entrepreneur 
combines inventions, initiative, and investment to create the start-up.”); see also WASSERMAN, supra 
note 43, at 6 (distinguishing “between the founding of high-potential startups and the founding of 
small businesses that are designed to remain small and owner-operated”); Darian M. Ibrahim & D. 
Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
71, 84-85 (2008) (“Entrepreneurial opportunities may be novel in a strong sense, which typically 
implies a technological breakthrough backed by venture capital financing, or they may be novel in a 
weak sense, such as opening a new restaurant in a vacant building.”). 
48 SPULBER, supra note 44, at 10; see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74-83 (1934) (Redvers Opie trans., Transaction Publishers 2012) 
(describing entrepreneurs as introducing new goods or methods of production or opening new 
markets or supply sources); PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO 
BUILD THE FUTURE 8, 10 (2014) (“Properly understood, any new and better way of doing things is 
technology . . . . New technology tends to come from new ventures—startups.”); Ibrahim & Smith, 
supra note 47, at 84 (“Entrepreneurship involves new products or services, new ways of organizing, 
or new geographic markets.”). 
49 GUY KAWASAKI, THE ART OF THE START 2.0: THE TIME-TESTED, BATTLE-HARDENED 
GUIDE FOR ANYONE STARTING ANYTHING 39 (2015); WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 304. 
50 Biotechnology startups face costs and risks associated with new drug development that are 
on a different scale and timeline than other innovative startups, and accordingly reflect specialized 
patterns of startup governance such as the prevalence of VC financing and joint ventures with large 
pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of 
Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 910-14 (2010) 
(observing that biotech often involves “a combination of venture capital and joint venture financing 
that reflects the nature of the technology being financed and the organizational structure through 
which the product is carried out”). 
51 See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 157 (2d ed. 2004) 
(“Entrepreneurs rarely have the capital to see their ideas to fruition and must rely on outside 
financiers.”); THIEL, supra note 48, at 45 (noting that startups “often lose money for the first few 
years: it takes time to build valuable things, and that means delayed revenue”). 
52 BRAD FELD & MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, STARTUP BOARDS: GETTING THE MOST 
OUT OF YOUR BOARD OF DIRECTORS 4 (2014). 
 
168 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1 
company with connections, resources, strategy, and expertise to succeed in 
launching its innovative product or service to the market.53 
After the early stage, startups typically become focused on refining 
product development to generate revenues and grow quickly. The key mid-
stage question is: Can we scale the manufacture, distribution, and sale of our 
innovative product or service?54 This question is often linked to the crucial 
issue of generating revenues or reaching profitability with a large market 
opportunity.55 To ultimately reach large exits, startups need to be able to 
scale.56 Venture capital firms that finance startups are based on a business 
model that depends on having a few “home runs” in the portfolio that account 
for much of the fund returns.57 Sequoia Capital, for example, invested $60 
million in WhatsApp, which later sold to Facebook for $16 billion—yielding 
a return to Sequoia of fifty times its investment.58 
As a startup evolves to late stage, its focus has typically shifted to 
managing a more complex organization and finding an exit to achieve 
liquidity for the participants holding equity stakes in the company. To have 
survived this long, the company has successfully developed some innovative 
product or service and generated customers and sales. The nature of the 
business may have become more complex, potentially involving global 
 
53 Id. at 5, 30, 68; see Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 286 (1997) 
[hereinafter Fisch, Boards] (“For a growth company in a developing field, faced with a variety of 
strategic decisions and an inexperienced CEO, the board’s role as manager may be an essential 
component of firm success. That role may require board members with developed industry expertise, 
business relationships with the firm, or even insiders.”). 
54 See, e.g., Ranjay Gulati & Alicia DeSantola, Start-Ups That Last, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 
2016, at 54, 55-61 (discussing critical activities to scale a venture and transition to a mature firm). 
55 See KAWASAKI, supra note 49, at 37 (explaining that the term scale “refers to the concept that 
there are processes in place that are fast, cheap, and repeatable,” giving rise to the possibility that 
“there will soon be millions of customers who generate billions of dollars of revenue”); THIEL, supra 
note 48, at 21 (discussing product development and “viral growth”); id. at 54-55 (discussing scaling). 
Growth is often discussed as equal or greater in importance as profitability for startups. See Fred 
Wilson, Profits vs Growth, AVC (June 25, 2015), https://avc.com/2015/06/profits-vs-growth/ 
[https://perma.cc/5S2J-YKRU]. 
56 See KAWASAKI, supra note 49, at 38 (“[I]f Pierre Omidyar had to test every used printer 
offered for sale, eBay couldn’t scale. If Marc Benioff had to make every sales call, Salesforce.com 
couldn’t scale. If Steve Wozniak had to manufacture every Apple I, Apple couldn’t scale.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
57 See THIEL, supra note 48, at 86-87 (noting that “the best investment in a successful fund 
equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund combined,” and that therefore “every single 
company in a good venture portfolio must have the potential to succeed at a vast scale”); see also Bob 
Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 131, 136 (“Given the portfolio 
approach and the deal structure VCs use, . . . only 10% to 20% of the companies funded need to be 
real winners to achieve the targeted return rate . . . . In fact, VC reputations are often built on one 
or two good investments.”). 
58 William Alden & David Gelles, In WhatsApp Deal, Sequoia Capital May Make 50 Times Its 
Money, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/in-whatsapp-deal-
sequoia-capital-may-make-50-times-its-money/ [https://perma.cc/9Z4K-VJYG]. 
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operations, new opportunities, competition, and continued challenges in 
terms of cash flow and growth.59 Founders who have not kept up with these 
needs may no longer occupy top executive positions.60 For instance, Tesla was 
founded by Martin Eberhard, who was later fired and replaced by Elon Musk, 
a large investor and chairperson of the board.61 
Indeed, by the late stage the number of participants has likely grown 
significantly and the needs of some have changed. Although some early 
employees may have left the company, others have stayed and fully vested 
their stock options, building pressure for an opportunity to sell.62 Different 
types of investors may have participated in financing the company, and the 
most common type of large investor—the VCs—likely need the startup to 
find a liquidity event so that they can return cash to their own investors and 
make money.63 VC firms typically raise capital from passive limited partners, 
organized in funds with ten-year terms.64 Not only are VC firms sensitive to 
liquidity within the timing of a particular fund’s term, but their business 
model also depends on raising successive funds and thus their ability to 
generate returns affects their reputation and ongoing operations.65 As one 
partner explained, VCs are the “entrepreneurs behind the entrepreneurs.”66 
 
59 See ROBERT COOTER & AARON EDLIN, THE FALCON’S GYRE: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF ECONOMIC INNOVATION AND GROWTH 2.2-2.3 (2014) (discussing the life cycle of an 
innovative business venture including the rise of competition that eventually settles into 
equilibrium); WORKING GRP. ON DIR. ACCOUNTABILITY & BD. EFFECTIVENESS, A SIMPLE 
GUIDE TO THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF VC-BACKED COMPANY DIRECTORS 1 (Oct. 2007), 
https://www.levp.com/a-simple-guide-to-the-basic-responsibilities-of-vc-backed-company-
directors/ [https://perma.cc/X2Y9-S5LP] [hereinafter VC Director Guide] (noting that “business 
processes become more complex” through the startup stages). 
60 See WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 299 (finding that more than half of startups have replaced 
their CEO-founders by the time of their third rounds of financing); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. 
Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go Public? 1, 9-10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law 
Working Paper No. 405, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171237 
[https://perma.cc/M3HH-JKPA] (finding that in almost sixty percent of venture-backed firms that 
go public, the founder is no longer CEO at IPO). 
61 Dana Olsen, Ousted CEO Club: Founders Who Left Startups They Helped Build, PITCHBOOK 
(June 21, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/ousted-ceo-club-founders-who-left-startups-
they-helped-build [https://perma.cc/2NBP-H935]. 
62 See Pollman, Information Issues, supra note 37, at 194-96 (discussing employees and former 
employees participating in online marketplaces for trading private company stock). 
63 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity Versus Incentives, 
8 REV. FIN. 327, 331 (2004) (discussing the VC cycle which requires liquidating the proceeds of 
investment); Gilson, supra note 12, at 1070-76 (explaining the VC business model). 
64 Gilson, supra note 12, at 1071. 
65 Id. 
66 ROCHELLE KOPP & STEVEN GANZ, VALLEY SPEAK: DECIPHERING THE JARGON OF 
SILICON VALLEY 15 (2016) (quoting Keith Rabois from Khosla Ventures, with original attribution 
to Sequoia Capital). 
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In sum, a mature startup faces complex business challenges as well as 
growing pressure to sell the company or go public. Thus the key issues may 
range from particular strategic needs in addressing competitors or improving 
financial metrics, but will ultimately always come down to one essential 
question: Can we find an exit?67 Of course, the startup aims for success by 
not only finding an exit, but one that is lucrative for its participants and meets 
with their approval. 
2. The Complexity of the Capital Structure 
The nature of the startup business drives the forms and structure of 
entrepreneurial finance. Both of these dimensions of the startup in turn set 
the stage for governance. 
At the founding, entrepreneurs usually split the entire ownership pie by 
issuing the initial common equity to themselves as founders’ stock.68 
Founders generally pay a nominal amount for this stock because the company 
has minimal assets and business operations at the time of founding, and the 
stock is often structured to include a company repurchase right that lapses 
over time.69 In terms of initial capital, founders often ‘bootstrap’ the business 
using their own funds, and those of family and friends, to finance 
development efforts and early operations.70 One study found that in seventy-
seven percent of founding teams, at least one founder contributed seed capital 
early in the life of the startup.71 
High-potential innovative startups typically need far greater capital than 
founders can self-fund or raise through family and friends, however, and 
startups therefore seek alternate sources of capital.72 Traditional banks do not 
lend to startups, particularly in their early stages, due to their lack of a track 
record, negative cash flow, lack of tangible assets, and high failure rate.73 Two 
types of investors specialize in financing startups: angel investors and VCs. 
 
67 See, e.g., GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 51, at 28 (“A venture capitalist must liquidate a 
return in private firms to make money.”); PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 
VENTURE MONITOR 1Q 2018, at 13 [hereinafter NVCA, VENTURE MONITOR 1Q 2018], 
https://nvca.org/research/venture-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/5N59-9ULT] (follow “1Q 2018 
PitchBook-NVCA Venture Monitor” hyperlink) (“As companies move along the venture lifecycle, 
exits at some point move to the forefront of discussion and business positioning.”). 
68 CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO LAW 
AND STRATEGY 90-92, 95-96 (5th ed. 2018). 
69 THERESE H. MAYNARD ET AL., BUSINESS PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP 
BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 374, 375 (3d ed. 2018). 
70 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 252. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 253-54. 
73 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 51, at 6-7; Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of 
Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463, 465 (1996); 
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Angel investors are frequently the first source of outside funding—
wealthy individuals, often with backgrounds as successful entrepreneurs, who 
invest their own money in early-stage companies.74 Angels tend to rely on 
informal relationship-driven methods of screening and monitoring, or to 
aggregate their investments and efforts through regional angel groups.75 They 
fill a critical funding gap in the beginning of a startup’s life, often coming in 
earlier and in smaller amounts than VCs are willing to entertain because of 
the size of their funds and costs.76 Angels are generally forward-looking: they 
invest with the hope that the company can show enough business promise to 
attract subsequent financing by VCs. Angels typically receive common stock 
for their capital or invest through convertible notes or similar debt 
instruments that provide a means of making deferred equity investments with 
minimal transaction costs.77 
Thus, in the early stage of a startup, when it is highly focused on 
innovation, its capital structure is relatively simple: basic debt or equity 
granted to founders, family and friends, and angel investors. A startup will 
also usually adopt a stock option plan and establish a pool of options to grant 
employees an incentive-based ownership stake.78 Stock options for startup 
employees have become a norm because of cash constraints for high salaries, 
 
see also KUPOR, supra note 36, at 28 (noting that equity-based VC financing typically backs 
companies that are very risky and expect long periods of illiquidity and a lack of near-term cash 
flow). For a discussion of specialized venture lenders that follow venture capital investment, see 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169 [hereinafter Ibrahim, Venture 
Debt]. 
74 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1405, 1406, 1408-09 (2008) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Angel Investors]. A notable alternative or additional 
source of capital and expertise for early-stage startups is a startup incubator or accelerator program. 
For a discussion of investment accelerator programs, see, for example, Brad Bernthal, Investment 
Accelerators, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 139 (2016). 
75 Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 74, at 1408-09. 
76 Id. at 1416-18; Joshua Lerner, “Angel” Financing and Public Policy: An Overview, 22 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 773, 778 (1998). Recent years have also witnessed the development of an institutional seed 
market. KUPOR, supra note 36, at 271. 
77 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 13, at 1882 (“Significantly, angels tend to take common 
stock stakes, foregoing board seats, negative covenants, vetoes, and exit rights.”); see also John F. 
Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 165-73 
(2014) (describing convertible securities, simple agreements for future equity, and preferred seed 
stock). A typical debt instrument used in angel investing is the convertible note: “a debt instrument 
that may be converted into equity” and “pays interest, has a formal maturity date, gives the holder 
priority over equity holders, and puts the holder on an equal footing with other unsecured debt 
holders and trade creditors in liquidation.” Coyle & Green, supra, at 151. 
78 MAYNARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 337-38; see Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring 
Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455 [https://perma.cc/S39X-6ZRF] (“The 
rank and file employees of VC-backed companies often receive much of their pay as stock options.”). 
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the potential for stock options to incentivize employees, and the uncertainty 
that employees accept in joining the startup.79 
In light of capital needs for continued growth, many startups next seek 
additional financing from venture capital investors.80 VCs are professional 
investors—general partners of funds organized as limited partnerships—who 
put other people’s money to work.81 The passive limited partners include 
pension funds, endowments, foundations, banks, insurance companies, and 
others seeking access to a high-growth alternative asset class.82 The VC, acting 
as general partner of the fund, makes and monitors the investments in a 
portfolio of startup companies.83 As noted, funds have a fixed term, typically 
ten years, and the VC makes money by receiving an annual management fee 
plus carried interest—a right to receive a percentage of the profits made from 
the investments in the portfolio of startup companies.84 
A significant body of research examines the key issues that VCs face of 
great uncertainty combined with incomplete contracting problems, 
information asymmetry, and agency costs.85 Particularly through its early 
stages, a startup’s success is highly uncertain: Countless things can go wrong 
and cause failure, but extraordinary returns are also possible.86 VC contracts 
with entrepreneurs will inevitably be incomplete because of bounded 
rationality and the inability to foresee and resolve all potential contingencies 
 
79 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 18 (discussing norms in stock option practices). 
80 Not all startups seek, or succeed at, raising money from VCs. WASSERMAN, supra note 43, 
at 255; see Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Start-Ups Reject Venture Capital?, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. 
EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251, 251-52 (2013) (arguing that some startups should avoid venture 
capital to lower transaction and agency costs). Strategic investors such as corporate venture capital 
might provide an alternative source of financing. See Josh Lerner, Corporate Venturing, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Oct. 2013, at 86, 88-90; see generally Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Determinants of Corporate 
Venture Capital Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities, in 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 17 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
81 Gilson, supra note 12, at 1068, 1069 (explaining that VCs are “tailored to the special task of 
financing [the] high-risk, high-return activities” of startup companies, which are “peculiarly suited 
to commercializing innovation”). 
82 Id. at 1070. 
83 Id. at 1071. 
84 Id. at 1071-72. Many VC funds provide for the possibility of a one- or two-year extension at 
the discretion of the general partner VC managing the fund. J. Brad Bernthal, The Evolution of 
Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, 2018 BYU L. REV. 773, 843 n.276. 
85 See, e.g., GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 51; Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial 
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 281 (2003); Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog, Venture Capital Financing of 
Innovative Firms: An Introduction, in VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING AND THE VALUATION OF 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 1-26 (Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog eds., 2003); William A. 
Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990). 
86 See Strine, supra note 13, at 2037 (“Venture-backed companies are the kind of companies that 
can become wildly successful or fail entirely.”). 
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and outcomes.87 Further, “some information is observable by only one party 
(the entrepreneur) who cannot credibly communicate it to others (information 
asymmetry),” and “the parties cannot control post-financing behavior by 
contract because either the behavior itself or future states of the world cannot 
be verified by third party arbiters (agency problems).”88  
In response to these fundamental challenges, VCs screen, monitor, and 
control their startup investments.89 They use staged financing that can 
incrementally transfer control and threaten abandonment if the company 
falters.90 They contract for convertible preferred stock that comes with voting 
rights, liquidation preferences, and other protective terms.91 They negotiate 
for designated board seats for information, monitoring, and voice or control.92 
They contract for covenants to guard against certain unfavorable outcomes 
and for specific exit rights.93 
Consequently, the typical pattern is for a startup to engage in sequential 
rounds of issuing convertible preferred stock with various protective terms 
and designated board seats.94 In contrast to public companies, which generally 
have a single class of common equity, startups usually issue a new class of 
equity every twelve to twenty-four months in order to raise money to grow 
the company.95 Each round of financing varies with regard to its participants 
and the contract provisions associated with the new class of equity (valuation, 
 
87 OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23-24 (1995); see also 
Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 473, 473 (1992) (recognizing “that financial contracts are inherently incomplete” and 
that “founders of the firm must determine how future investment and operating decisions left out 
of the corporate charter ought to be taken”). 
88 George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 305, 307 (2001). 
89 See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital 
Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 55-64 (Michael J. 
Whincop ed., 2001); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 13, at 1878-82; Paul A. Gompers, Optimal 
Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1464 (1995) [hereinafter 
Gompers, Optimal Investment]; Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 318-55; supra note 85. 
90 Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 323-24. 
91 Id. at 346-54. A liquidation preference typically entitles the holder to its original investment 
amount, or a multiple of this number, in certain events before payments are made to other security 
holders. KUPOR, supra note 36, at 155. 
92 Id. at 318-19. Venture capital firms have traditionally used this model of convertible preferred 
stock financings, however it is possible that with the rise of new technologies such as blockchain and 
crypto, the industry will evolve. See, e.g., Alex Konrad, Blowing Up the Venture Capital Model (Again), 
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2019), at 64, 67-68 (discussing how the prominent VC firm Andreessen Horowitz 
has registered the firm as a financial advisor to enable it to pursue additional models of investments). 
93 Gilson, supra note 12, at 1074, 1082, 1084-85. 
94 Funding rounds are traditionally ordered alphabetically: Series A, Series B, Series C, and 
so on. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 78, at 3. 
95 Id. at 2. 
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liquidation preferences, exit rights, etc.).96 Each round of financing generally 
also brings changes to the company’s governance structure, such as the size 
and composition of the board.97 
As the company takes on additional capital, the founders’ and other earlier 
investors’ ownership percentage in the company is diluted.98 According to the 
National Venture Capital Association, using data from Capshare, the capital 
structure “evolve[s] in fairly predictable ways as the company grows.”99 
Specifically, “employee ownership decreases from 100% at founding to 
approximately 70% in the seed round and starts to level off around 38% by 
Series C financings. Employee ownership (and by extension, investor 
ownership) is so predictable that it almost perfectly fits a log trend line.”100 
Altogether, over its life cycle, a venture-backed startup will have an 
increasingly complex capital structure. It includes not only founders and 
employees, but also a variety of shareholders with different associated 
valuations, cash flow, and control rights.101 Consider an example. In its startup 
days, payment-technology company Square Inc. raised $150 million by issuing 
9.7 million Series E Preferred Shares for $15.46 per share to a variety of 
investors.102 These shares would convert to common shares if the company 
did well and the holders wanted to participate in the upside, but came with 
downside protections that provided Series E investors at least $15.46 per share 
in a liquidation or acquisition and at least $18.56 per share in an IPO, with 
both of those claims senior to the claims of all other shareholders.103 The 
Series E shares followed several other classes of equity (common, Series A, 
B-1, B-2, C, and D Preferred Shares), each with different cash flow, 
liquidation, control, and voting rights.104 
 
96 Multiple VCs or other investors form a syndicate to participate in each round of financing. 
BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS 10-11 (2d ed. 2013). VCs often specialize in 
early-, mid-, or late-stage financings, and other investors may participate, such as from private 
equity, family offices, or strategic partners. See id. at 6 (advising that “VCs come in many shapes, 
sizes, and experience levels”); NVCA, VENTURE MONITOR 1Q 2018, supra note 67, at 5, 12 
(observing that private equity, family offices, and strategic partners have gotten involved in early 
financing of startups). 
97 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 307. 
98 See MAYNARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 577 (noting that dilution can result whenever a 
company issues more shares of stock). Investors can avoid dilution by negotiating for a right of first 
refusal in future rounds of financing. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Financing, 
24 J. CORP. L. 949, 969 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Team Production in VC]. 
99 NVCA, VENTURE MONITOR 1Q 2018, supra note 67, at 9. 
100 Id. 
101 FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 43; Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 78, at 3; see 
also FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 96, at 95-97 (discussing startup capitalization tables). 
102 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 78, at 3. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. Square’s IPO price was $9 per share and Series E holders received extra shares per their 
negotiated protective terms. Leena Rao & Dan Primack, Square Prices IPO at Just $9 Per Share, Valued 
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Adding to this traditional venture-backed structure has been the entrance 
into late-stage startups of different types of investors: mutual funds, pension 
funds, hedge funds, corporate investors, and sovereign wealth funds.105 
Startups in previous times did not generally have access to these kinds of 
investors until going public on a national stock exchange.106 Due to a 
confluence of factors, including an unprecedented influx of available private 
capital, startups are staying private longer on average and raising larger late-
stage funding rounds from this greater diversity of investors.107 
Late-stage rounds of investments also have various protective terms, 
including in some instances IPO veto rights or ratchets that can dilute other 
shareholders, and thus add to the “extreme complexity of VC-backed 
companies’ financial structures.”108 A notable recent study of 116 unicorn 
companies found that the average unicorn has eight share classes, and many 
have a wide mix of equity holders including founders, employees, VC funds, 
mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, corporate investors, and others.109 
In addition to new entrants, another recent trend is for startups to use 
proceeds from a fundraising round to repurchase stock or to facilitate third-
party buyers such as large institutional investors in making secondary tender 
offers.110 These transactions allow certain shareholders to sell some of their 
 
at $2.9 Billion, FORTUNE (Nov. 19, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/18/square-prices-ipo/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7Z2-UA34]. 
105 Sergey Chernenko et al., Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23981, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23981 
[https://perma.cc/3C96-Y88Y]; Sungjoung Kwon et al., Mutual Fund Investments in Private Firms, J. 
FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2941203 [https://perma.cc/KJR8-LV6Q]; see Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? 
A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory 
Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2017) (discussing how “mutual funds, including some of the 
most prominent, are allocating portions of their portfolios to private venture-stage firms”). 
106 See Kwon et al., supra note 105, at 1-3 (tracing data on mutual fund investment into startups 
over the 1995–2016 period and finding that such investment has “become increasingly widespread”). 
107 Erdogan et al., supra note 3; PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE 
MONITOR 2Q 2018, at 11, https://nvca.org/research/venture-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/5N59-
9ULT] (follow “2Q 2018 PitchBook NVCA Venture Monitor” hyperlink). 
108 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 78, at 2; see also Barry J. Kramer et al., Unicorn Survey As 
of December 2016, FENWICK & WEST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/
Pages/Unicorn-Survey-As-of-December-31-2016.aspx [https://perma.cc/98YK-FS2Q] [hereinafter 
Fenwick Unicorn Survey] (surveying IPO upside and downside protections in unicorns). 
109 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 78, at 2. 
110 For an overview of secondary transactions in private company stock, see Pollman, 
Information Issues, supra note 37, and for recent developments, see Eliot Brown & Greg Bensinger, 
The Latest Path to Silicon Valley Riches: Stake Sales, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/investment-firms-buy-stock-in-startups-long-before-ipos-1511045818 
[https://perma.cc/WRQ3-XG4N]; Telis Demos, Tech Pain: Startups Are Buying Back a Lot More 
Employee Stock, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-pain-startups-are-
buying-back-a-lot-more-employee-stock-1454457599 [https://perma.cc/7X57-PLZJ]; Tess Stynes & 
Bradley Hope, Nasdaq Acquires SecondMarket, Profit Rises 12%, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2015), 
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holdings and bring new investors into the company, but do not provide 
complete liquidity or involve a fundamental change, and thus the company’s 
private, venture-backed status remains unchanged absent an exit event.111 As 
the next Part shows, these companies can reach a size and level of governance 
complexity that strains continued use of the term “startup” to describe them, 
but they still differ in distinctive ways from traditional closely held 
corporations and public corporations. 
II. A FRAMEWORK OF STARTUP GOVERNANCE 
Startups demonstrate unique features and challenges through the nature 
of their business and the complexity of their capital structure. Prevailing 
models of corporate governance have not fully captured the special dynamics 
of startups. 
Most notably, one general model has dominated the discussion of 
corporate law and governance for decades: agency costs.112 Set out in a 
seminal paper by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, the agency problem 
arises when one party, the “principal,” relies on actions taken by another, the 
“agent,” which will affect the principal’s welfare.113 As a theory of corporate 
governance, shareholders are envisioned as the principals and managers as the 
agents.114 Agency costs arise in a corporation because of the separation of 




111 See, e.g., Theodore Schleifer, Uber Employees Will Get a Second Chance to Make Some Money 
By Selling Their Shares, VOX: RECODE (May 23, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/5/23/17386314/
uber-employees-tender-offer-ipo [https://perma.cc/6P7W-FAG7] (discussing unmet demand from 
Uber employees for liquidity through secondary tender offers). 
112 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 248 (describing the principal-agent model as the 
dominant analytical framework in corporate governance literature); Goshen & Squire, supra note 9, 
at 769 (“For the last forty years, the problem of agency costs has dominated the study of corporate 
law and governance.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 621, 623 (2004) (“Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the modern literature of corporate 
law and economics.”). 
113 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 308. Jensen and Meckling did not limit their theory to 
agency relationships under the law, but rather used the concept as a metaphor and basis for economic 
theory. See id. (discussing agency costs as an economic theory); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The 
Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. 
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (undertaking economic modeling of certain problems 
encountered in a principal-agent relationship); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of 
the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289-90 (1980) (explaining the efficiency of the separation of 
ownership and control in the “large modern corporation” in terms of agents providing management 
and shareholders serving as risk bearers). 
114 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 310. 
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their own agenda at the expense of shareholder interests.115 As set out by 
Jensen and Meckling, three types of agency costs exist in the principal-agent 
relationship: monitoring costs that principals incur in overseeing their agents, 
bonding costs to better align agents’ interests with those of the principals, 
and the residual loss that cannot be avoided.116 As other scholars have noted, 
the concept of reducing shareholder-manager agency costs pervades 
corporate law scholarship.117 
Jensen and Meckling’s framing of the agency cost problem has thus 
proven enormously influential, but they did not explore differences across 
corporations.118 They envisioned the corporation only in vertical, hierarchical 
terms, and they collapsed the board and executives into a single managerial 
agent, obscuring management conflicts.119 They assumed outside shareholders 
have homogeneous interests.120 
Two key scholarly contributions challenge and build on the agency cost 
model, bringing it closer to descriptive power for startups. First, Margaret 
Blair and Lynn Stout’s well-known team production model provided the 
critical insight that stakeholder interests conflict and are resolved within the 
corporation.121 Blair and Stout claimed to provide only a theory of public 
corporations, with an independent board unlike that found in startups, but 
 
115 Id. at 308-09; see also Goshen & Squire, supra note 9, at 769 (“Agency costs result from the 
separation of control and ownership that occurs when managers run a firm but must share its profits 
with equityholders.”). 
116 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 308. 
117 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 9, at 769 (“Many scholars—we refer to them as agency-cost 
essentialists—treat the reduction of agency costs as . . . an unalloyed good toward which all aspects of 
corporate law and governance should be directed.”); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate 
Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 570 (2016) (“The existing corporate-law literature 
focuses solely on protecting minority shareholders from agency costs.”). 
118 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 309 (describing the corporate agency problem in 
general terms); see also Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of 
the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 182 (2011) (noting 
that Jensen and Meckling’s agency-cost approach “typically did not seek to explore why such 
agency problems are different within and across firms”); cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra 
note 16, at 228 (“We employ a dichotomous treatment [of public and closely held corporations] to 
illustrate the different kinds of incentives and structures in play, not to suggest that all firms were 
cast in one of these two molds.”). 
119 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 309 (“[T]he relationship between the stockholders 
and manager of a corporation fit the definition of a pure agency relationship . . . .”); cf. Goshen & 
Squire, supra note 9, at 767, 784-85 (introducing a principal-cost theory positing that firms trade off 
the costs produced when investors exercise control against the costs produced when managers 
exercise control, and treating the board and officers as “a unified agent”). 
120 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 312 (analyzing the agency costs of “outside equity” 
by distinguishing between the “owner-manager” and “outside shareholders”); see also Iman Anabtawi 
& Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1271 (2008) 
(“Shareholders in public corporations traditionally have been perceived not only as being passive 
but also as having largely homogenous interests.”). 
121 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 250-51. 
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they contributed a vision of the corporate “team” that includes “shareholders, 
managers, [and] rank and file employees” and identified the board as playing 
a critical role in coordinating corporate activity and mediating disputes 
between these team members.122 
Second, Robert Bartlett added the essential observation that “an 
interinvestor conflict can exist among a company’s investors and thereby give 
rise to a horizontal agency problem.”123 Not only can stakeholder interests 
conflict, as Blair and Stout observed, but intragroup tensions may also develop. 
Bartlett’s model showed that in seeking to constrain shareholder-manager 
agency costs, VCs stage their financings and syndicate their investments—
but in so doing, the VCs create a new dimension of conflict among 
themselves, for example regarding the timing and price of future financings 
and exit.124 Put simply, Bartlett showed that the way in which VCs manage a 
vertical conflict with founder-entrepreneurs can create a horizontal conflict 
among VCs. Bartlett focused on the conflicts between VCs as preferred 
shareholders, but suggested the model had broader applicability, arguing that 
corporate theory had created a “false dichotomy” between public and private 
firms.125 In his view, “this dichotomy obscures how all firms—public and 
private—often face the same agency problems.”126 
Building on these important insights, this Part seeks to provide what is 
missing from existing models: an in-depth, holistic account of the governance 
issues that arise in startups and how they evolve over time. This account is 
tailored to the special features of startups and intragroup tensions that Blair 
and Stout did not examine in their theory of public corporations. Further, it 
builds on Bartlett’s insight of conflicts between preferred shareholders and 
offers a comprehensive account of the complicated and overlapping sets of 
vertical and horizontal tensions. And it departs from both by setting out to 
show what makes startups different and the implications that follow. 
A. Fundamental Startup Governance Issues 
All startup participants play a role in governance: founders, executives, 
investors, and employees. These participants typically all have a stake in the 
 
122 Id. at 251, 253. Blair and Stout espoused a “model of the public corporation” and envisioned a 
board with “independence from individual team members” unlike that found in startup corporations. 
See id. at 251. For discussion of the aspects of team production theory that bear similarity to startups, 
see Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 619, 
626 (2015) [hereinafter Pollman, Private Company Boards]; Smith, Team Production in VC, supra note 98. 
123 Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 61. 
124 Id. at 63, 108-09. 
125 Id. at 40. 
126 Id. at 37; see also id. at 44 (providing “groundwork for a new model . . . that applies to all 
firms, public and private”). 
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equity and have closely aligned objectives at the highest level: they are all 
economically incentivized to grow the value of the company and to reach a 
highly valued exit.127 However, in a great variety of circumstances their 
interests diverge. The below discussion elaborates on the conflicts that can 
arise between and among each of these startup participants because of 
differences in types and classes of stock and options, liquidity time horizons, 
and potential private benefits and incentives.128 The costs of these conflicts 
include value-reducing opportunistic behavior, inefficiencies stemming from 
divergent preferences for company actions, bargaining and enforcement costs 
to minimize misalignment, and potentially a higher cost of capital.129 
1. Vertical Issues 
At core, governance challenges are born when a company becomes jointly 
owned. If there is more than one founder, the potential exists for conflict.130 
The governance issues in the cofounder relationship generally pale in 
comparison, however, to the conflicts that can arise when the founders take 
outside investment. The balance of power between founders and investors is 
one of the key tensions that runs through startups. This section explores those 
governance issues in the context of the corporate hierarchy, most notably 
involving the board, which is the primary governing body and locus at which 
founders and investors determine control. 
a. Shareholders vs. Board 
Startup boards are negotiated. The board is formally constituted at the 
first round of venture capital financing, if not before, and its agreed-upon size 
and composition are typically specified in the financing term sheet and then 
enshrined in a voting agreement or in the corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation.131 VCs seek board seats as part of their investment—for access 
 
127 Steven E. Bochner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board Member’s Survival 
Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2016); NVCA 
YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
128 Experienced startup entrepreneurs and investors recognize the potential for both inter- and 
intra-group governance conflicts. See FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 42 (“Transactions 
often have conflicting interests between classes of stock, investors with different liquidity time 
horizons, and management versus investment interests.”). 
129 See Oliver Williamson, Richard T. Ely Lecture, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“Maladaptation to disturbances is where the main costs of governance reside.”); see 
also Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 111-12 (discussing how governance conflicts might raise 
the cost of capital). 
130 See, e.g., Scott Kupor, Prenups for Co-Founders, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (Oct. 19, 
2015), https://a16z.com/2015/10/19/prenups-for-co-founders [https://perma.cc/2QMD-WSSG] 
(discussing planning for problems between startup co-founders). 
131 FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 65-66, 81. 
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to information, to monitor against opportunistic behavior, for voice or control 
on important decisions such as future financings or exit, and to add value to 
the company.132 
VCs are in fact sometimes called “smart money” in reference to the value-
adding services that they provide, such as serving as a sounding board to the 
founders and team, helping to recruit management personnel, formulating 
business strategies, and providing contacts.133 Further, VCs serve as 
reputational intermediaries, lending credibility and legitimacy to startups, 
particularly in their early stages.134 Because they take an equity stake that 
involves a long-term relationship with the entrepreneurs, they have an 
incentive to provide strategic guidance and invest in efforts to bridge the 
information gap.135 Serving on the board is one of the means by which VCs 
provide this value and monitor their investment.136 
Advice to entrepreneurs regularly includes the admonition to carefully 
choose board members, and therefore from which VCs to take money. For 
example, a partner from the prestigious VC firm Andreessen Horowitz 
explained: “The best board members aren’t elected by default. CEOs that set 
themselves up with their choice of board member—which means getting 
more than one term sheet and doing extensive reference checking—are better 
off. You want to find a coach, not a lever puller.”137 Accordingly, the potential 
benefits of being backed by reputable VCs are well known—but so are stories 
of entrepreneurs being fired from their own companies.138 Most famously, 
Steve Jobs, one of the cofounders of Apple, was ousted from the company he 
helped to start a few years after the company went public.139 Entrepreneurs 
generally want to maintain control of the company they have started for as 
long as possible and thus negotiations over board seats are critical governance 
points to both investors and founders. 
 
132 See Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial 
Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1329 n.39 (2013); Fried & Ganor, supra note 13, at 
989-93; supra subsection I.B.2. 
133 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 273; Smith, Team Production in VC, supra note 98,  
at 953, 956-67. 
134 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 271; Gilson, supra note 12, at 1075. 
135 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 51, at 3 (noting the “novel checks and balances” the 
VC industry has developed to respond to information problems). 
136 See, e.g., FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 68 (describing this participation as the 
“VC value add”). 
137 Id. at 56. 
138 See id. at 12 (noting that from the entrepreneur’s perspective, taking VC money means 
“it’s no longer your company—you are now working for somebody else. If you don’t perform, you 
will get fired.”). 
139 See Matt Weinberger, This is Why Steve Jobs Got Fired From Apple—And How He Came Back 
to Save the Company, BUS. INSIDER (July 31, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/steve-jobs-
apple-fired-returned-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/3UKS-ZXWL]. 
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Three basic types of startup boards exist: founder-controlled, investor-
controlled, and shared control.140 The first two are straightforward in 
referring to situations in which one group outnumbers the other in allocated 
board seats or board votes.141 The third type, shared control, can be structured 
in various ways such as with an even split between founder and investor board 
seats, with a split board and one or more independent directors, or as 
contingent control with the tie-breaking seat filled by the preferred and 
common shareholders voting together as a single class.142 
Researchers have found a general trend in the evolution of a typical 
startup board over its life cycle—frequently starting out dominated by 
founders and transforming to shared or investor control at some time within 
the first few rounds of venture financing.143 This pattern occurs because 
investors typically build their voting power and seek additional board seats 
with each round of financing.144 Furthermore, shared control arrangements 
provide a solution to problems of noncontractibility by deferring decisions 
until they are known.145 But there is a great deal of variety and some founders 
maintain control of the board even as the company matures to late stage.146 
 
140 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 285-87; see KUPOR, supra note 36, at 173 (“Any 
configuration is permissible; where we end up is simply a function of the negotiating positions of 
each of the parties.”). 
141 A founder-controlled board may occur through seats allocated to a common stock vote or by 
founder appointment. An investor-controlled board may occur through seats allocated to different 
series of preferred stock. The lead investor of a financing round typically negotiates for a board seat. 
See WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 285-88 (describing board control and changing composition). 
142 See Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 461, 462 (discussing the use of independent directors in startups); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra 
note 85, at 289-90 (finding that board control is shared 61% of the time); Smith, Exit Structure, supra 
note 12, at 326 (discussing contingent control). 
143 See WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 285 (observing that in one sample of startups, “after the 
A-round of financing, founders were already a minority within the average board, holding 34% of 
the seats, while outside directors already held 59%. After the B-round, founders were down to 21% 
of the seats, with 72% held by outside directors, the clear majority of whom were investors.”); Smith, 
Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 326-27 (“Because venture capitalists typically gain additional board 
seats with each round of investment, over time the board composition provisions of venture-backed 
companies tend to move from ‘entrepreneur control’ or ‘contingent control’ to ‘investor control.’”). 
144 Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 324-26. VCs also protect themselves with regard to 
exits or opportunistic action by securing negative contractual covenants that require VC approval 
for important transactions such as acquisitions. Id. at 319-20. 
145 Bratton, supra note 12, at 896; see Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating 
Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 335 (2015) (discussing how a solution to the problem of 
“productive activity that requires complex, difficult to measure, and difficult to contract inputs” is 
“[t]he delegation of key decision rights to a ‘mediating hierarchy’”). 
146 See Bratton, supra note 12, at 901 (“VC[s] and [entrepreneurs] each have boardroom control 
in significant numbers of portfolio companies.”); see also FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 47 
(“A few [founders], like Mark Zuckerberg, have become, in Noam Wasserman’s words, both rich and 
king. To do this, you need to have a large stock position and voting control, which can be achieved 
[through a dual-class structure] even if you don’t own more than 50 percent of the company.”). 
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In some instances, startups have implemented dual-class structures that 
give supervoting shares to founders and management, providing another 
mechanism by which founders and managers control the board and strategic 
decisions.147 For example, while still a startup, Airbnb implemented a dual-
class structure of common stock in which one class holds ten votes per share 
and the other holds just one vote per share.148 Such structures are relatively 
commonplace in the highest echelon of unicorns but are otherwise rare, 
suggesting that only a small portion of founders have enough leverage and 
investor competition to implement this feature.149 Key aspects of the nature 
of the business, discussed in Section I.B—high market potential, growth, and 
scalability—may impact whether or not entrepreneurs can get the founder-
friendly terms they covet.150 
The board and voting control are therefore the product of multi-party 
sequential negotiations. Control can change over time and it is frequently 
separated from ownership or, more precisely, from cash flow rights using 
contracts.151 This process of heavily negotiating boards, contractually 
 
147 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 85, at 7 (“Board rights and voting rights can be different 
from cash flow rights and from each other.”); Fenwick Unicorn Survey, supra note 108, at 1, 6 
(surveying thirty-one United States-based, venture-backed unicorns and finding that thirty-nine 
percent of their financings had dual-class supervoting common stock); Alfred Lee, Inside Private 
Tech Voting Structures, THE INFO. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/inside-
private-tech-voting-structures [https://perma.cc/ZL2F-XXNW] (finding that as of October 2015, 
nine out of ten of the highest valued private tech companies had supervoting structures and the one 
exception had a founder with extra voting rights on the board that gave the founder control). 
148 Lee, supra note 147. 
149 See Alfred Lee, Where Supervoting Rights Go to the Extreme, THE INFO. (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/where-supervoting-rights-go-to-the-extreme [https://
perma.cc/6NYQ-UX2C] (summarizing a study of more than one hundred private companies, thirty 
of which had supervoting shares); see also Rolfe Winkler & Maureen Farrell, In ‘Founder Friendly’ 
Era, Star Tech Entrepreneurs Grab Power, Huge Pay, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-founder-friendly-era-star-tech-entrepreneurs-grab-power-huge-
pay-1527539114 [https://perma.cc/JM4C-S7PY] (“Last year, 67% of U.S. venture-backed tech 
companies that staged IPOs had supervoting shares . . . , up from 13% in 2010 . . . . The proportion 
rises as tech companies get larger: 72% of founders of U.S. tech startups valued over $1 billion that 
had IPOs over the past 24 months have supervoting shares . . . .”). For an examination of dual-class 
IPOs, see Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-
Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852. 
150 See Alfredo De Massis et al., What Big Companies Can Learn from the Success of the Unicorns, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/03/what-big-companies-can-learn-from-the-
success-of-the-unicorns [https://perma.cc/XM36-HLYX] (“Unicorns get big fast.”). This point 
raises potential explanations for dual-class structures not fully explored in the literature. See Goshen 
& Hamdani, supra note 117, at 560 (“[E]ntrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them 
to pursue their vision . . . in the manner they see fit.”); Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Nonvoting Shares and 
Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 687, 687 (2019) (arguing that nonvoting stock can 
“make corporate governance more efficient”). 
151 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 85, at 281 (“We find that VC financings allow VCs to 
separately allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control 
rights.”); Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of 
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separating ownership and control, and using designated seats provides a sharp 
contrast to public companies which typically lack negotiations, lack voting 
agreements, and lodge nominating power in the board itself.152 
In startups, the board is not only the site of value-adding managerial 
guidance, but also one of the key arenas in which conflicts are resolved and 
investments are protected.153 VCs and founders often diverge with respect to 
risk level, liquidity needs, and private benefits, which are often implicated in 
critical board-level decisions on financings, strategic direction, and exit. 
To the extent a party in these battles did not get a decision resolved in its 
favor or consistent with its position, conflicts can arise between shareholders 
and the board. For example, shareholders might oppose a board decision 
regarding the timing or pricing of a round of financing that will affect their 
interests. These conflicts typically stem, however, from the divergence 
between the interests of founders and investors who are both shareholders 
and reflects a balance of control that was already negotiated in determining 
the size and composition of the board.154 This understanding problematizes 
characterizing the shareholder-board relationship as simply vertical, 
according to standard convention.155 The relationship is hierarchical in the 
sense that it is the shareholders who determine the board, but the relationship 
is not one of pure agency as commonly envisioned, with the founder-
entrepreneur as the agent and the VC as the principal.156 
 
Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments 2 (Sept. 1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (discussing how contracts that allocate control rights to VCs independent of cash 
flows create a “separation of ownership and control [that] has important implications for the 
efficiency of entrepreneurial firms”). 
152 For a discussion of board elections and shareholder voting in public corporations, see Paul 
H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary 
Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2014). 
153 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 284; Gilson, supra note 12, at 1077; Smith, Exit Structure, 
supra note 12, at 318. 
154 Protective provisions and other terms that VCs contract for in preferred stock financings 
can also give rise to conflicts between shareholders and the board. See KUPOR, supra note 36, at 201 
(providing an example of a board-approved acquisition that could be blocked by “a preferred series 
of investor who has a small economic stake in the company but a disproportionate say in the 
acquisition outcome by virtue of having a series-specific protective provision vote”). 
155 See Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 290 (“The notion that directors are shareholders’ agents 
has exerted enormous influence in the theoretical literature.”). 
156 See Smith, Team Production in VC, supra note 98, at 949-50 (discussing the standard 
convention of referring to the VC as principal and the entrepreneur as agent and arguing that the 
relationship is not in fact a “pure agency relationship” and instead has aspects of “team production” 
(internal quotations omitted)); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 795 (2002) (characterizing the board as “not 
a mere agent of the shareholder, but rather . . . a sort of Platonic guardian serving as the nexus of 
the various contracts that make up the corporation”). 
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b. Board vs. Founders or Executives 
Standard models of corporate governance often collapse the board and 
executives into a single category of managerial agents.157 But startups involve 
participants in overlapping roles with dual status—participants with 
managerial control are therefore not simply agents of a monolithic body of 
principal-like shareholders. Conflicts can arise in startups between the board 
and the founders or executives that have significant governance dimensions. 
The most typical scenarios involve the board firing a CEO-founder or 
deciding to change strategic direction over the objection of the founder or 
other executives. As discussed above, startups evolve through dramatically 
different business phases.158 Because the skills and experience needed to start 
an innovative company are often different from those needed to grow and 
lead a large corporation, the board might decide that it needs to put a new 
executive in a leadership position that had been held by a founder. In a survey 
of 212 startups conducted by entrepreneurship scholar Noam Wasserman, by 
year three only fifty percent of founders were still CEO, with the percentage 
of CEO-founders declining further over time.159 Studies that focus on 
companies that go public similarly find a significant rate of CEO-founder 
succession by the time of IPO.160 
The prevalence of founder departures makes sense in light of the fact that 
VCs attribute a large number of startup failures to problems with the CEO 
and management team.161 Monitoring the CEO is one of the key functions of 
the board—it should step in if a CEO is underperforming.162 And sometimes 
 
157 See supra note 119. 
158 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
159 Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2008, at 102, 104. It is 
for this reason—prevalent CEO-founder succession issues—that this Article refers throughout to 
founders and executives. 
160 See Steven N. Kaplan et al., Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the 
Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies, 64 J. FIN. 75, 78 (2009) (finding that 
among all the nonfinancial startups that held IPOs in 2004, a founder was CEO of only forty-nine 
percent); Broughman & Fried, supra note 60, at 1 (finding with a sample of over 18,000 venture-
backed companies that in almost sixty percent of startups that go public, the founder is no longer 
CEO at the time of the IPO). 
161 See Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman, What Do Venture Capitalists Do?, 4 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 231, 238-39 (1989) (surveying 49 VCs about 96 of their portfolio companies and finding 
that for ninety-five percent of those companies VCs cited problems within the management team as 
a top-three contributing factor to failure, and the most important contributing factor for sixty-five 
percent of companies); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: 
Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177, 2178, 2190 (2004) (analyzing sixty-seven 
internal investment memoranda from eleven VC firms and finding that concerns about the CEO 
and management team led the list of investment risks for sixty-one of the startups). 
162 See Fisch, Boards, supra note 53, at 282-89 (discussing the monitoring and managing 
functions of the board); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, 
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a board’s replacement of the CEO-founder is paradoxically a sign of the 
founder’s success in fundraising and getting the company to a stage at which 
it has outgrown the founder’s abilities.163 
Many instances of a board replacing a CEO-founder are thus routine, but 
genuine disputes can also arise regarding whether the board is properly acting 
in the best interest of the corporation. VCs and other fund managers that 
have designated seats on a startup board are “dual fiduciaries” in that they are 
fiduciaries of the startup company by virtue of serving as directors, and they 
also owe duties to the VC fund they manage and its limited partners.164 In 
many instances, the interests of the startup company and the VC fund will 
align, but in some circumstances they will not because of the liquidity needs 
of the fund and the terms of the preferred stock that the VC investor holds, 
such as liquidation seniority that entitles the VC investor to get paid back 
before other investors. 
It is therefore possible for the board to act opportunistically in ousting a 
CEO-founder or in other decisions affecting founders or executives. For 
example, in one recent case involving a startup dispute the court noted: 
Venture capitalists frequently replace the founder-CEO. It is self-evident 
that such a decision could be appropriate. But it is also true that a founder-
CEO may have greater incentive and ability to resist strategies that favor the 
holders of preferred stock (the venture capitalists) over the holders of 
common stock (the founders and employees).165 
c. Shareholders vs. Founders or Executives 
The preceding discussion has examined governance conflicts that involve 
the board of directors. Sometimes startup shareholders simply sidestep the 
board, however, when a conflict arises between shareholders and founders or 
executives. This is understandable in light of the fact that shareholders in 
startups generally lack one of the most commonly used mechanisms for 
 
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801-03 (2001) 
(discussing board functions). 
163 See WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 303-05 (discussing “the paradox of entrepreneurial 
success” in product development or fundraising that can manifest in CEO-founder succession). 
164 Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 127, at 1; see In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holder Litig., 
Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 4383127, at *30 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (discussing the standard for 
proving that a director faced a “dual fiduciary problem” under Delaware law), abrogated on other grounds by 
Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., C.A. No. 11418-VCG, 2018 WL 3599997 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2018). 
165 Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., 65 A.3d 618, 665 (Del. Ch. 2013), abrogated on other grounds 
by El Paso Pipeline GP Co. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 1264 (Del. 2016). 
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dealing with governance problems—exit.166 Unlike public company 
shareholders, they cannot easily sell their stock when they are dissatisfied with 
the management. 
VC contracting is designed to reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetry and, while board seats are a significant part of this design, 
mechanisms that do not rely on the formal structure of the board are also 
used—both contractual and structural. One of the primary examples of such 
a control mechanism is staged financing.167 VCs commit capital in sequential 
rounds rather than as a full upfront investment of the amount that the startup 
will foreseeably need.168 By staging their investments, VCs have a lever to set 
milestones for the managers—reducing agency costs—and the option to 
periodically reassess and decide whether to invest in another round of 
financing or “abandon” the investment—reducing information asymmetry 
and the impact of uncertainty.169 Existing investors are an important source 
for continued capital and introductions to other potential investors; many 
startups fail before getting to profitability.170 Thus, staged financing can have 
a “disciplining effect” on founders, who typically fear running out of cash and 
having to shut down.171 
Mechanisms such as staged financing cannot, however, eliminate all 
tensions between shareholders and founders or executives. Notably, the 
disciplinary effect of staged financing is nullified when private capital is 
readily available to the startup. Furthermore, shareholders, founders, and 
executives often have different interests with respect to allocation of control 
and critical corporate decisions such as those regarding the timing and form 
of financings and exit.172 A particular VC’s interests and position with respect 
 
166 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 46 (1970) (explaining that investors generally employ exit 
rather than voice if exit is available). 
167 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 290. 
168 Id. 
169 Id.; see also Gompers, Optimal Investment, supra note 89, at 1462-63 (finding, in a sample of 
794 venture-backed companies between 1961 and 1992, that VCs used smaller and more frequent 
rounds for startups with greater uncertainty). 
170 See Bratton, supra note 12, at 939-40 (contrasting VC-backed startups, for which “[o]utside 
capital is needed for survival,” with “poorly performing mature firms” that might nevertheless 
“survive for years”). 
171 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 291. This fear can be counterbalanced by founders’ desire 
to avoid taking on more capital than needed and to achieve as much growth as possible between 
rounds of financing in order to minimize the dilution of their own percentage of equity ownership. 
See id. (observing that founders may resist outside investment in order to maintain control). 
172 Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 356; see FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 68-
69 (“[A]t some point, . . . there starts to be a series of forces that drive pressure for exits, including 
the desire of most firms to raise another fund . . . . As a result, some VCs start to pressure the 
companies they are investors in to sell earlier than the entrepreneurs might otherwise desire . . . .”). 
 
2019] Startup Governance 187 
to these issues may depend on the fund’s age and performance.173 An investor 
may even have a different strategic vision for business operations that creates 
tensions with founders and executives. For example, SoftBank reportedly 
pushed its portfolio company Brandless to change its retail strategy to 
accelerate its pathway to profitability, ultimately leading its cofounder and 
CEO to step down from her executive role.174 And while parties are aligned 
in seeking a financial return, founders and executives may also receive private 
benefits, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary, from the continued operation of 
the startup or from particular exit opportunities.175 
Signs of these kinds of challenges between investors and founders have 
begun to fill courtrooms and grab national headlines. For example, before 
going public, ride-hailing giant Uber experienced “one of the biggest VC-
founder disputes in history.”176 An early VC investor in the company sued the 
then CEO-founder for seeking additional power on the board while also 
allegedly failing to disclose his “gross mismanagement and other 
misconduct.”177 A series of scandals at the company had come to light, 
including the development of a secret tool to evade law enforcement agencies, 
a sexual harassment crisis that prompted a high-profile internal investigation, 
and the alleged theft of trade secrets from a competitor.178 The contentious 
lawsuit among insiders shocked observers and ended as eventfully as it began, 
with a grand bargain tied to a multi-billion dollar investment from a new, 
major institutional investor that would restructure the company’s governance 
to a seventeen-person board and provide liquidity to the plaintiff-VC and 
some of the other early investors and employees.179 Notably, the solution to 
 
173 See KUPOR, supra note 36, at 84 (noting that “depending on how well the GP is doing 
converting her other portfolio companies into profit, she might think differently about liquidity with 
respect to your company. How the fund is doing may also influence your GP’s willingness to invest 
additional money in your startup or . . . seek an exit.”). 
174 Zoe Bernard, Inside the Turmoil at SoftBank-Backed Brandless, THE INFO. (June 26, 2019), 
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175 Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 341-42. 
176 Katie Roof, Benchmark’s Lawsuit Against Former Uber CEO Kalanick Dismissed, 
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/25/benchmarks-lawsuit-against-
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177 Complaint ¶ 5, Benchmark Capital Partners VII, L.P. v. Kalanick, 2017 WL 3437765 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 10, 2017) (No. 2017-0575) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
178 Id.; Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-
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one conflict gave rise to a broader group of investors with different terms and 
a larger board, increasing complexity and the likelihood of diverging interests 
among board members.180 
2. Horizontal Issues 
The next fundamental set of governance issues are horizontal and concern 
the conflicts that arise between shareholders and the costs of collective 
decisionmaking.181 Because shareholders may hold different types of equity 
interests with varied terms and preferences, they may have conflicting 
interests and incentives to take actions that would harm other shareholders 
or make inefficient decisions that fail to maximize aggregate welfare.182 In 
startups, these costs can reach great size as different contributors to the 
corporation—founders, employees, and investors—hold various equity 
interests.183 Furthermore, startups distinctively feature interrelated vertical 
and horizontal issues, as the same participants appear in both types of issues, 
 
benchmark-reach-terms-1510516418 [https://perma.cc/PU9Y-43Z9]; Mike Isaac, Uber Sells Stake 
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Kalashian v. Advent VI Ltd. P’ship, No. CV-739278, 1996 WL 33399950, at *1-2 (Cal. App. Dep’t 
Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1996) (denying VC-defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a dispute 
involving founder-minority shareholders claiming harm from a dilutive financing); José M. Padilla, 
What’s Wrong With a Washout?: Fiduciary Duties of the Venture Capitalist Investor in a Washout Financing, 
1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 269, 276-78 (2001) (discussing the Kalashian case). 
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Blair, supra note 145, at 322. 
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which highlights the heterogeneity of their interests and the shifting, 
overlapping nature of their roles. 
a. Preferred vs. Common 
The classic horizontal conflict in startups is between the holders of 
preferred and common stock. Both represent an equity stake and are thus 
aligned in desiring the startup to get as large of an exit as possible. Aside 
from this point of alignment, however, they often conflict in terms of how 
much risk they prefer, how and when to raise additional funding, how and 
when to go for an exit, and any number of other scenarios.184 In addition, 
founders, who typically represent a significant portion of the common equity, 
may receive private benefits from retaining ownership of the company that 
preferred shareholders do not enjoy.185 
To illustrate, the preferred-common conflict may come to a head in a 
situation in which a startup is on the verge of running out of capital. Preferred 
shareholders might prefer to sell the company because of their liquidation 
preferences that give them a senior claim to be paid back all or a portion or 
multiple of their investment. Furthermore, because VCs have a business 
model that relies on a small number of home runs driving their returns, they 
might prefer to cut their losses when it has become clear that a particular 
startup in their portfolio will not likely reach a large exit.186 But if the sale 
price is not higher than the aggregate liquidation preferences, the common 
shareholders would get nothing and would thus prefer to raise another round 
of financing or debt to prolong the possibility of upside gain, even if it means 
putting the preferred shareholders’ investment at greater risk.187 
 
184 See, e.g., Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 127, at 3 (explaining that down-round 
financings, recapitalizations, and sales of the company are transactions in which the interests of the 
preferred and common shareholders can conflict); Bratton, supra note 12, at 922-45 (discussing 
problems for preferred shareholders and contractual solutions that evolved in the VC context); 
Padilla, supra note 180, at 278-85 (discussing “washout financings” that can occur when startups are 
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185 Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 318. Further, founders sometimes push for “early” 
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not maximize the expected value of the startup. See Matthew Wansley, Beach Money Exits, 45 J. 
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2-3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?
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186 See Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W. RES. L. 
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In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holder Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 4383127,  at *30 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (discussing “the dual fiduciary problem” faced by constituency directors 
approving a recapitalization in which their interests as participants diverged from those of the non-
participating common shareholders); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
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Corporate law provides a mechanism that responds to the problem of 
opportunism within the corporation: fiduciary duties. Directors and officers 
owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to serve the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.188 Fiduciary duties are therefore understood 
as filling in the gaps of incomplete shareholder contracts.189 But in venture-
backed startups with multiple classes of equity, what is required by the duty 
to serve the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders? 
Competing theories of how to interpret and apply fiduciary duties in the 
startup context highlight the divergence between the preferred and the 
common. Three views have emerged: common maximization, enterprise 
value maximization, and a contractual approach. 
Delaware courts and jurists have to date adopted the first view, holding 
that in the circumstance of a preferred-common conflict, directors owe a duty 
to common shareholders as the residual claimants.190 In the words of the 
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court: “[T]he law suggests that when 
push comes to shove, the board has a duty to prefer the common’s interests, 
as pure equity holders, over any desire of the preferred for better treatment 
based on some generalized expectancy that they will receive special treatment 
beyond their contractual rights.”191 Corporate law scholars have pointed out 
that this interpretation can give rise to inefficient outcomes that fail to 
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2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017) (“In the standard Delaware formulation, fiduciary 
duties run not only to the corporation, but rather ‘to the corporation and its shareholders.’” (quoting 
In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014)). 
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maximize aggregate welfare. Consequently, they argue for an understanding 
of fiduciary duty that requires directors to maximize the aggregate value of 
all classes of equity—otherwise stated as firm value—without regard to its 
allocation.192 Other scholars argue for an approach that reflects the norms of 
negotiating control in startups. This view would take into account the fact 
that the common had ceded control to the preferred or vice versa and would 
allow for favoring the interests of different types of shareholders so long as 
any decision can be defended as in the best interests of the corporation or on 
the basis of contract.193 
Taken as a whole, this debate shines light on the potential for 
opportunistic conduct and the difficulty of balancing the interests of the 
preferred and common. It is not the only horizontal conflict that arises in 
startups, however, as the following discussion shows. 
b. Preferred vs. Preferred 
Despite holding the same general type of equity, preferred shareholders 
are not always aligned in their interests. Each round of financing that a 
startup raises typically results in a different series of preferred stock with 
different pricing and terms. In certain scenarios, these differences put the 
preferred shareholders in conflict.194 As a white paper written by 
prominent VCs acknowledged: “[D]ifferent investors even within the same 
round may have different exit valuations in mind; one investor may be 
happy selling the company for $100M while another may need $300M to even 
consider a deal.”195 
 
192 See Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 13, at 290-95 (analyzing the Trados decision and 
concluding that it undermines the usefulness of the corporate form in maximizing firm value); 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 13, at 1885-87, 1904-06 (arguing that common stock maximization 
may make the enterprise less valuable and create perverse incentives). 
193 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 183, at 1333 (“The founders and common shareholders 
agreed that if things went well, they would all get rich, but if things went badly, the investors would 
come first.”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 13, at 1021-22 (interpreting pre-Trados case law as a “control-
contingent” approach and advocating for allowing corporations to opt into different approaches in 
their charters); Sepe, Constituency Directors, supra note 27, at 309 (advocating for “turning a director’s 
obligation of undivided loyalty to the common shareholders into a default rule”). 
194 Similarly, a strategic investor such as corporate venture capital that had an additional 
relationship with or interest in the startup might be differently positioned than other preferred 
shareholders. Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 61-62. 
195 VC Director Guide, supra note 59, at 4. The white paper is the product of a group of thirty-
three VC industry experts who “collaborated to examine recurring boardroom challenges” and 
promote director education because “[h]igh functioning boards maximize the potential for [VC-
backed companies] to be a financial success.” Id. at 2. For a discussion of how misalignment can arise 
from interests outside of a particular investment, see Brian Broughman, Elizabeth Pollman & D. 
Gordon Smith, Fiduciary Law and the Preservation of Trust in Business Relationships, in FIDUCIARIES 
AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW (Matthew Harding & Paul B. Miller eds., 
forthcoming Cambridge Univ. Press) (on file with author). 
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The high-profile dispute in Benchmark Capital v. Vague brought to light 
the tension among preferred shareholders.196 The VC firm Benchmark 
invested in the Series A and B preferred stock of Juniper Financial, an online 
bank startup.197 Juniper subsequently raised a Series C financing entirely from 
one new investor, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), which 
negotiated for a senior liquidation preference and majority voting power, 
subject to existing Series A and B veto rights which CIBC could waive if the 
waiver did not “diminish or alter [the Series A and B holders’] liquidation 
preference or other financial or economic rights.”198 The Series A and B 
preferred shareholders, including Benchmark, seemingly agreed to these 
terms with the belief that they had veto rights and the Series C financing 
would be the company’s last.199 Shortly after, however, Juniper announced 
additional capital needs and plans to raise a “down round” Series D financing 
from CIBC.200 This round was structured as a merger to strategically avoid 
the Series A and B veto rights and it significantly diluted their interests—
dropping their collective equity interests from twenty-nine percent to seven 
percent and reducing their aggregate liquidation preference from $115 million 
to $15 million.201 Benchmark sued in an attempt to enjoin Juniper from 
proceeding with the financing, but ultimately lost in a court battle which 
narrowly construed the contractual veto rights.202 
Conflicts among preferred shareholders can arise not only regarding 
financing, as in Benchmark v. Vague, but also regarding an IPO or sale of the 
company. For example, a late-stage preferred shareholder who paid $20 per 
share would view less favorably a proposed IPO at $18 per share than an early 
preferred shareholder whose average price paid was $2 per share.203 Diverging 
interests could stem from different returns that would be gained and 
differences in timing and liquidity horizons.204 Preferred shareholders 
respond to these potential misalignments by contracting for various 
 
196 Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ.A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423, at *1-2 
(Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff ’d sub nom. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper Fin. Corp., 
822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003) (unpublished table opinion). 
197 Id. at *2-3. 
198 Id. at *1-3. 
199 Id. at *2 & n.8. 
200 Id. at *4. 
201 Id. at *4-5 & n.20. 
202 Id. at *2, *10, *16. For an additional example of a dispute between preferred shareholders 
involving a financing, in which preferred shareholders not participating in the transaction had their 
shares converted to common pursuant to a pay-to-play provision, see WatchMark Corp. v. ARGO 
Global Capital, LLC, No. Civ.A 711-N, 2004 WL 2694894 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 2004). 
203 See Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 74 (“[I]nvestors holding higher-priced 
securities may simply be more willing than holders of lower-priced securities to postpone an exit 
event until the next ‘up’ market.”). 
204 Id. 
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protections, such as veto rights and automatic conversion provisions, but 
incomplete contracts are inevitable and the misalignment cannot be entirely 
eliminated: It will arise where the capital structure has preferred shareholders 
with different amounts of the company’s differently priced securities and 
varying terms.205 
c. Common vs. Common 
Finally, the third type of horizontal conflict involves common 
shareholders. The potential for divergent interests between common 
shareholders in startups is remarkably undertheorized in the literature, with 
scholarly study of specific scenarios, but no broader identification and 
examination of the issue. Most accounts lump together founders, executives, 
and employees as the common shareholders and do not explore how their 
incentives become misaligned.206 Yet in the real world of startups, conflicts 
among common shareholders can arise at critical junctures for the 
corporation. Identifying horizontal conflicts among common shareholders in 
startups also spotlights another underappreciated governance feature—
employees. Startup employees participate in equity arrangements and often 
represent part of the essential value of the company and influence its 
decisionmaking. 
Traditional accounts of employees assume they are fungible and their 
inputs can be easily obtained through market contracts.207 Corporate theory 
often excludes employees from analysis, treating them as “nonshareholder 
constituencies” that are protected by contract and labor regulation.208 Scholars 
posit that employees will be accorded significant ownership stakes only in the 
rare circumstance in which they have highly homogeneous interests.209 But 
these assumptions about employees simply do not hold up in startups. 
 
205 Id. at 70, 74-76. 
206 An additional source of horizontal complexity can arise in startups that raise capital 
through convertible debt instruments or variants such as “Park-n-Ride” instruments. See Bernthal, 
supra note 84, at 850 (discussing anticipatory and post-investment conflicts that can arise for non-
shareholder investors who have bargained for rights to future equity). 
207 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 266-67 (“[T]he Alchian and Demsetz model . . . 
assumed that employees were undifferentiated inputs that were hired, or at least could be hired, in 
atomized markets. In other words, it viewed employees as interchangeable units that brought no 
special skills to—and, more importantly, made no special investment in—the team.”). 
208 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 442 (explaining that the shareholder 
primacy view “merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting” workers, 
consumers, and the public “lie outside corporate law”). 
209 See Hansmann, supra note 16, at 596 (“[W]orker ownership tends to arise only where there 
is extreme homogeneity of interest among the workers involved.”). Hansmann also observed that 
worker-owned firms often “give members the right of exit at will on reasonable terms.” Id. at 598. 
Startups notably differ in this respect as well, constrained by private company status. 
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Startup employees often bring special skills to the venture and make 
nonseparable contributions such as by collectively developing technology.210 
The market for talent can be competitive and employees are often strongly 
associated with the startup itself—reflected in the fact that sometimes large 
corporations buy startups in “acqui-hire” deals in order to access teams of 
startup employees.211 Moreover, it is difficult for employees to protect their 
contributions through contract alone in light of the uncertainty that 
characterizes startups, particularly in their early stages, and in light of the 
contributions employees make that can affect firm value. Startups therefore 
usually grant employees stock options that vest over time and which, once 
exercised, are common stock.212 This provides employees with the possibility 
of sharing in the upside of the startup, and in the aggregate can represent a 
significant stake of the corporate equity. For example, when Facebook went 
public it had employee equity grants covering more than 961.5 million shares, 
worth $36.5 billion at the IPO price.213 
Employee participation in startup governance is often indirect—the board 
seats negotiated for the common shareholders are generally dominated by 
founders and executives, and option holders’ voting rights do not ripen until 
the options are vested and exercised.214 Nonetheless, employees are important 
participants in the ownership and control of the startup and their interests 
can conflict with other common shareholders. 
Divergence among the common shareholders can arise when the company 
has an acquisition offer or is being sold, in secondary sales in which some 
 
210 See Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup 
Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1261-63, 1273-76 (2018) (discussing how the origins of Silicon 
Valley employee stock option practices recognized the value and talent of startup employees as 
knowledge workers and how options facilitate investment in human capital and innovation); see also 
MARGARET M. BLAIR, WEALTH CREATION AND WEALTH SHARING 9-16, 45 (1996) (discussing 
the asset-specific investment of human capital); Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & 
Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 
BELL J. ECON. 250, 250 (1975) (discussing “jobs for which nontrivial job-specific skills and task-
specific knowledge evolve”). 
211 See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 287-302 (2013) 
(describing the prevalence of acqui-hiring by large technology companies such as Google and 
Facebook). 
212 MAYNARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 337-44. Stock options may also motivate employees to 
serve as monitors of other employees. Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of 
Employee Stock-Based Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (2007). 
213 Facebook, Inc., Amendment No. 8 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 8 (May 16, 
2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512235588/d287954ds1a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WC9M-V3AB]; see also Cable, supra note 18, at 621 (summarizing Facebook’s 
registration filing). 
214 Employees are also in a precarious position, as illustrated by the Zynga “clawback,” in which 
the company demanded that certain employees give back some of their options to the company 
before going public, or else be fired and forfeit all unvested options. Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga 
Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 578 (2013). 
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shareholders have an opportunity to sell their shares, and even in everyday 
corporate decisionmaking such as regarding whether to extend the exercise 
period for certain optionholders. These circumstances can pit employees and 
angel investors against founders and executives, different types of employees 
such as engineers against non-engineers, and current or early-stage employees 
against former or late-stage employees. 
For example, because equity arrangements for employees can vary with 
regard to the form of grant, exercise price, vesting schedule, and other terms 
such as the triggers to accelerate vesting on a change in control, employees 
can end up on opposite sides of a vote on whether the company should take 
an exit deal. Web technology firm Feedburner ended up in exactly this 
situation because it had made inconsistent equity arrangements with its early 
employees.215 When the company received an acquisition offer, employees 
with one equity structure wanted the company to sell while others did not.216 
In many circumstances, the issue arises because founders and executives 
possess information and an opportunity to extract rents that other common 
shareholders do not have. In a study of trade sales of venture-backed startups, 
Brian Broughman and Jesse Fried found that in forty-five percent of the deals 
in their data set, the VCs had given on average nine percent of the deal value 
to the entrepreneurial team to induce agreement.217 Their findings show that 
sometimes the deal sweetener was a carve-out for all common shareholders 
to participate in pro rata, but other times the deal sweetener was a 
management bonus to founders and executives that excluded other common 
shareholders.218 The majority of liquidity events for startups are trade sales,219 
suggesting that this conflict occurs relatively frequently. 
Another example arises when startups have difficulty raising financing. In 
this situation, startups often look for an opportunity for an “acqui-hire” rather 
than liquidate the company.220 But acquirers typically want engineers and 
may not hire the other employees.221 This can align the buyer and the 
engineers against the investors and other employees regarding how to 
distribute the aggregate deal consideration.222 
Finally, the phenomenon of startups staying private longer has presented 
new conflicts among common shareholders. When startups raise late-stage 
rounds of financings, they often also facilitate secondary sales to give partial 
 
215 WASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 240. 
216 Id. 
217 Broughman & Fried, supra note 132, at 1325. 
218 Id. at 1335-39. 
219 VC Director Guide, supra note 59, at 3. 
220 Coyle & Polsky, supra note 211, at 295. 
221 Id. at 299. 
222 Id. at 299-300. 
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liquidity to certain shareholders—this means deciding between early, late, 
and former employees.223 
In addition, startups have been faced with deciding whether to extend the 
typical ninety-day exercise period for departing employees who might 
otherwise forfeit their vested options because they lack the cash necessary to 
pay the exercise price and taxes.224 Yet doing so effectively transfers wealth 
from employees who choose to stay at the company, because the options 
would otherwise return to the pool and be available for new hires or refresh 
grants, and increasing the pool dilutes the ownership of all existing 
shareholders.225 Providing an extended exercise period can also misalign the 
employee and company interests as it can incentivize employees to quit and 
join a new company to diversify their risk once they have vested some of their 
options.226 Despite these concerns, Pinterest and Quora extended their 
exercise periods to seven and ten years post-departure respectively, allowing 
former employees to potentially enjoy the liquidity of a later IPO or sale of 
the company.227 These issues pose difficult tradeoffs and potentially magnify 
tensions between the holders of common stock and options. 
B. Increasing Governance Issues Over Time 
As the above framework has demonstrated, startups include a variety of 
different participants with different interests. Shareholders are 
heterogeneous. Further, these participants face conflicts between and among 
themselves—that is, startups involve inter-group conflicts such as between 
shareholders and the board, and intra-group conflicts such as between 
common shareholders. The vertical and horizontal conflicts are interrelated, 
with the same participants appearing in different configurations and serving 
in overlapping roles. But these governance issues do not arise all at once. 
They develop over time in an increasing pattern. 
At the founding stage, ownership and control are fully aligned in the 
founder. Governance is not an issue because there are no relationships or 
 
223 See A Guide to Employee Liquidity Programs: Why and How Companies Align the Interests of 
All Parties, FOUNDERS CIRCLE, http://www.founderscircle.com/secondary-employee-aligned-
liquidity-guide/ [https://perma.cc/PVN7-LKAT]. 
224 Scott Kupor, The Lack of Options for (Startup Employees’) Options, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ 
(June 23, 2016), http://a16z.com/2016/06/23/options-timing/ [https://perma.cc/HNY8-SHDX]. 
225 Id. 
226 Scott Kupor, Recommendations for Startup Employee Option Plans, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ 
(July 26, 2016), https://a16z.com/2016/07/26/options-plan/ [https://perma.cc/W5JU-4WH5]. 
227 Ed Zimmerman & Jim Gregory, Stock Options: VC-Backed Startups Extend Post-Termination 
Exercise Period, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardzimmerman/2017/08/
27/stock-options-vc-backed-startups-extend-post-termination-exercise-period-ptep/#63ed345d5568 
[https://perma.cc/R7ET-WMKV]. 
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conflicts to manage within the corporation, as Figure 1 depicts. The amoeba-
like simplicity of governance is readily apparent. 
 
Figure 1: Founding Stage 
 
But what kind of company can one person build alone? As one former 
entrepreneur observed, “It’s very hard to go from 0 to 1 without a team.”228 
And, as subsection I.B.1 elaborates, the early stage is typically a key period of 
bringing an innovation to market, which presents technological challenges 
and financing needs. Some startups involve two or more cofounders, which 
creates the potential for disagreement about ownership stakes and 
management roles and decisions.229 Early-stage startups usually hire 
employees and grant them an incentive-based equity stake such as restricted 
stock or stock options that will vest. They seek a seed round of financing, as 
described in subsection I.B.2, which often adds angel investors. These 
additions of outside investors and employees creates governance challenges 
that can be understood as horizontal between equity holders (or debt and 
equity), and simultaneously vertical with the founder acting as a managerial 
agent, per Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Seed Stage 
 
 
228 THIEL, supra note 48, at 109. 
229 See Kupor, supra note 130. 
198 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1 
 
Startups that take venture capital financing again increase potential 
governance issues—but as subsection I.B.1 explains, the nature of the startup 
business often necessitates this tradeoff in order to bring an innovation to 
market or fuel growth. Because VCs typically finance startups through 
convertible preferred stock, the first round of VC financing adds another layer 
of horizontal governance issues between the common and preferred 
shareholders (C and P), as subsection II.A.2 describes. At or before this time, 
a startup also typically establishes a formal board structure, which adds to 
layers of potential vertical dilemmas, as discussed in subsection II.A.1. In 
addition, employees vest stock options for common stock over time and thus 
potentially play a more significant role in governance conflicts as the company 
matures. Figure 3 illustrates this dynamic.  
 
Figure 3: Venture-Backed [Series A] 
 
When the startup raises a second round of venture financing, it yet again 
increases potential governance issues. Unless the second round is exactly pro 
rata with precisely the same investors, the potential for conflicts between the 
preferred shareholders arises (P1 and P2), as represented in Figure 4 with an 
additional layer of horizontal conflict among shareholders and additional 
diversity of interests represented on the board. With each additional round, 
the pattern continues (P3, P4, P5, etc.).  
 
2019] Startup Governance 199 
Figure 4: Venture-Backed [Series B & On (P3, P4, P5, etc.)] 
 
Further, the startup may hire additional executives and employees with 
varied types of incentive-based equity and associated terms, adding to 
potential divergences between the interests of common shareholders (C1 and 
C2), also represented in Figure 4. Additional complexity may arise from other 
capital sources such as corporate venture capital or debt.230 
In sum, startup governance typically evolves from relatively simple to 
very complex sets of tensions between and among participants—it is not 
static and yet on the whole it changes in predictable ways. Venture-backed 
startups share this feature because of the way that VC financing adds to the 
different types of participants and equity in sequential rounds. Even an 
individual participant’s interest may shift as liquidity needs ripen and other 
affiliations with the corporation change.231 The emergence of a greater 
diversity of investors in startups and the trend of startups staying private 
longer on average might aggravate these issues. Investors represent a larger 
universe of interests, not all investors have board representation, and the 
separation of ownership and control grows. 
Although scholars usually discuss the corporate framework and 
governance challenges in fixed terms, this Part has shown these are actually 
fluid issues. Startups face interrelated horizontal and vertical governance 
 
230 See supra notes 73, 80 & 194. 
231 See William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums 
and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7 (1987) (“Complex capital structures and other costly 
contracts arise because the preferences of the investor group can change over time.”). 
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issues and involve heterogeneous shareholders, overlapping governance roles, 
and dynamic change. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE PATHS 
This final Part explores new insights that the framework of startup 
governance can offer on issues of current debate. The implications are 
numerous, ranging from offering greater explanatory power for the challenges 
that startups face to bolstering arguments for applying corporate law 
principles flexibly in the startup context. 
A. Understanding Challenges 
The increasing nature of governance conflicts and overlapping roles in 
startups help illuminate two current controversies: monitoring failures and 
companies navigating the complexities of staying private longer. 
1. Monitoring Failures 
Scholars have generally assumed that VCs have strong incentives to 
monitor startups in their portfolios based on their substantial investments 
and the prevalence of VCs negotiating for designated board seats.232 This 
traditional framing reflects the standard agency-cost model, which applied in 
the startup context has narrowly focused on the vertical relationship between 
VCs and entrepreneurs.233 Recent scandals have put a spotlight on 
monitoring failures by startup boards, however, that raise a puzzle not 
explained by the existing literature. 
If VCs are strong monitors, why are examples of oversight failures in 
startups so plentiful and varied? A series of scandals emerged at Uber in the 
years before it went public involving regulatory evasion, sexual harassment, 
 
232 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 50, at 901 (“Very powerful incentives for all participants—
investors in venture capital funds, general partners of the funds, and entrepreneurs—are coupled 
with very intense monitoring of entrepreneurs by venture capitalists, and monitoring of venture 
capitalists by the capital market.” (emphasis omitted)); Ibrahim, Venture Debt, supra note 73, at 1194 
(“In the start-up context, VCs are strong monitors, thereby reducing the need for lender monitoring 
to curtail managerial slack.”). 
233 See Bartlett, False Dichotomy, supra note 11, at 48 (“VC scholarship has been concerned with 
primarily one question: How do VC investors respond to the extreme uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and agency problems inherent in VC investment?”). Studies of VC oversight include 
Shai Bernstein et al., The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring, 71 J. FIN. 1591, 1591 (2016), which finds 
that VCs’ “on-site involvement with their portfolio companies leads to an increase in both innovation 
and the likelihood of a successful exit”, and Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private 
Firms, 50 J. FIN. 301, 309-15 (1995), which finds that VC representation on the board increases around 
the time of a CEO replacement and that geographic distance is an important determinant of the 
board membership of VCs. 
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and alleged theft of a competitor’s trade secrets.234 Investigative reporting 
revealed that the blood-testing device developed by Theranos did not match 
the founder's hype but rather was unreliable and flawed—the company raised 
$900 million and reached a $9 billion dollar valuation before its undoing.235 
At SoFi, a consumer finance startup valued at over $4 billion, it took several 
years before the board stepped in and fired the CEO-founder despite reports 
of rampant misconduct and misrepresentations to customers.236 Human-
resources startup Zenefits paid millions in fines to regulators after it came to 
light that the company created software to enable its employees to cheat on 
state-required licensing courses.237 WeWork’s failed IPO revealed 
questionable financial dealings between the company and its CEO-founder, 
among other governance concerns.238 And the list of examples goes on.239 
This Article’s framework sheds light on why monitoring failures may 
occur.240 Two main explanations emerge once we take into account that the 
VC-entrepreneur relationship is not simply a vertical principal-agent 
relationship, but instead part of a system of startup governance that puts 
heterogeneous participants in overlapping roles that creates both vertical and 
horizontal tensions that tend to increase over time. 
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First, early-stage startups need a managerial board to add resources and 
guidance—this value-add is what VCs are known for and aim to provide.241 In 
light of the great uncertainty at this stage regarding whether any value will be 
created, the board typically invests little in compliance and internal 
controls.242 This makes sense because, as Section I.B explains, the company is 
usually still figuring out if it can even make an innovative product or service 
that people want and develop a strategy to bring it to market.243 
But the key point is what comes next—as a startup moves beyond its 
early stages, board members have incentives to prioritize growth and 
profits. As the framework in Part II demonstrates, the potential for 
governance conflicts typically increase across time.244 Board members—
whether investors or founders—need the company’s valuation to keep going 
up in order to raise another round of financing and not get significantly 
diluted, and eventually to reach an exit that generates returns.245 An upward 
valuation trajectory also avoids problems associated with “underwater” stock 
options, which provide little retention or incentive value to employees because 
the exercise price is greater than the current value.246 Startups must grow fast 
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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3293883 [https://perma.cc/Z3XE-BUXX] 
(finding that “corporate leaders make vastly different choices about when and how to implement . . . 
standards” and that, on average, pre-IPO companies did not become “serious about developing a 
corporate governance system” until six years after formation). 
243 See supra subsection I.B.1 (discussing early-stage focus on innovation, high failure rate, and 
VC business model focused on achieving returns with a small number of high-potential companies). 
244 See supra Section II.B. 
245 On this point, one prominent venture capitalist remarked, “I’m a bit sick and tired of the 
[fact that the] objective of every operating plan I see is to get the business to a point where it can 
raise money at a much higher price . . . . I’d prefer to see an operating plan that has the objective of 
getting to sustainable profitability.” Wilson, supra note 55; see also Erin Griffith, Silicon Valley Is Trying 
Out a New Mantra: Make a Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019), http://nytimes.com/2019/10/08/
technology/silicon-valley-startup-profit.html [https://perma.cc/U2LM-39KY] (discussing venture 
capital investors’ focus on growth and profits). 
246 See Jeffrey P. Crandall et al., Davis Polk Discusses Down-Round Financings of Private 
Companies: Considerations for Outstanding Equity Compensation Awards, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/03/01/davis-polk-discusses-down-round-
financings-of-private-companies-considerations-for-outstanding-equity-compensation-awards/ 
[https://perma.cc/B4R9-FA4W] (discussing strategies for dealing with underwater stock options); 
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to achieve an exit that benefits all participants without putting them at odds 
with each other. To the extent that company culture or lack of compliance 
imperils the company’s ability to achieve a successful exit, board members have 
an incentive to monitor and invest in controls; otherwise, they will likely 
prioritize growth and profits.247 
Second, whereas the VC literature often adopts the standard framing of 
the VC as principal and the entrepreneur as agent, in fact these key 
participants frequently serve in overlapping roles. Startup directors are both 
the monitor and the subject—a dual status which may engender conflicts of 
interest and weaken oversight. 
As explored in the analysis above, startup boards are the result of 
sequential multi-party negotiations.248 Directors typically hold designated 
seats, for example allocated to a founder or a particular series of preferred 
stock. Constituency directors may identify with their representative role. For 
example, VCs serving on boards may see themselves more as investors than as 
agents or fiduciaries of the corporation and all shareholders.249 Staged 
financing contributes to this view by putting VCs in a position of being asked 
to invest again in future rounds of preferred stock at the same time as wearing 
a governance hat. In addition, VCs invest in a portfolio of startups and often 
sit on multiple boards, which may reinforce their perspective as an investor 
and result in “overboarding,” or a decrease in the amount of attention and 
resources they can invest in monitoring each company.250 
 
Mark Poerio & Sean Honeywill, What To Do With Underwater Stock Options, PAUL HASTINGS (Nov. 
2008), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/1080.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK2S-
FM2P] (noting that underwater stock options in executive compensation packages have “little 
retention or incentive value”). 
247 In some of the startups in which oversight failures have recently come to light, it was 
employees rather than the board that prompted the investigations: an engineer’s public blog post 
catalyzed the sexual harassment investigation at Uber, and an employee at Theranos exposed the 
misconduct by alerting regulators and the Wall Street Journal. Maureen Dowd, She’s 26, and Brought 
Down Uber’s C.E.O. What’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/21/style/susan-fowler-uber.html [https://perma.cc/VVW6-LG4J]; John Carreyrou, Theranos 
Whistleblower Shook the Company—and His Family, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-whistleblower-shook-the-companyand-his-family-
1479335963 [https://perma.cc/UZL5-9AR6]. 
248 See supra subsection II.A.1. 
249 See, e.g., FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 52, at 70 (“Recognize that a VC is taking a 
board seat as a fiduciary responsib[ility] to his own investors (his LPs). While he also has a legal 
duty to the company as a board member, his duty as a fiduciary to his investors will often take 
precedence.”); cf. Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 127, at 4 (“[F]iduciary duties tend to run 
primarily to the common stockholders, as the relevant case law views preferred stockholder rights 
as a function of, and protected primarily by, contract law.”). 
250 See Zider, supra note 57 (observing that the “popular image of venture capitalists as sage 
advisors is at odds with the reality of their schedules. The financial incentive for partners in the VC 
firm is to manage as much money as possible. The more money they manage, the less time they have 
to nurture and advise entrepreneurs.”); Alfred Lee, How Many Board Seats Is Too Many?, THE INFO. 
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The litigation between VC firm Benchmark Capital and Uber cofounder 
and former CEO Travis Kalanick, discussed in Section II.A, demonstrates this 
dynamic that arises from participants holding overlapping roles. Benchmark 
was one of Uber’s early VC investors and held a large equity stake in the 
company and a designated board seat.251 The firm sued Kalanick, claiming that 
he “intentionally concealed and failed to disclose his gross mismanagement 
and other misconduct at Uber.”252 The complaint notably takes the perspective 
of Benchmark as an investor—but the firm also held a board seat. It was that 
director’s duty to take an active role in monitoring the corporation’s 
management and putting in place information reporting systems and controls 
that would bring to light misconduct occurring at the company.253 The 
complaint highlighted the concealment of information from investors rather 
than the monitoring role of directors.254 
The other aspect of overlapping roles that might affect board monitoring 
arises from the relational nature of startup governance. VCs and other startup 
investors are repeat institutional players in a reputation-based market for 
investments.255 As investors they could be characterized as principals in the 
startup, but in a very real sense they get hired or chosen by founders—the 
agents in traditional models.256 Recent work has traced the changing market 
 
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/how-many-board-seats-is-too-many 
[https://perma.cc/Z6CV-XKEU] (identifying twenty-four VCs who hold nine or more directorships 
at tech startups, including one VC who sits on eighteen boards). 
251 See Complaint, supra note 177, at ¶¶ 19-20 (noting that at the time of the lawsuit Benchmark 
held “approximately 13% of Uber’s stock, including approximately 20% of Uber’s voting power, 
approximately 36% of the preferred stock voting power and approximately 0.5% of Uber’s Class B 
common stock” and Uber’s voting agreement provided for a board seat “designated by Benchmark”). 
252 Id. at ¶ 4. According to the complaint, this failure induced Benchmark to execute a 
stockholder consent and amended voting agreement that created three new board seats to be 
designated by Kalanick. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. 
253 For a discussion of directors’ oversight responsibility, see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (identifying failure to monitor as a potential basis for 
director liability). See also Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 
(Del. 2006) (establishing the standard for a Caremark oversight claim); Hillary A. Sale, Fiduciary 
Law, Good Faith, and Publicness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 763, 779 (Evan 
J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (explaining that “good faith requires establishing risk oversight, internal 
controls, and monitoring systems, as well as evaluating the effectiveness of the systems over time”). 
254 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 177, at ¶¶ 2, 5, 6, 30, 65, 77. 
255 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 254-55 (1998) (arguing that VC opportunism is 
constrained by reputational concerns). 
256 See KUPOR, supra note 36, at 20-22 (noting that in the post-2005 era of VC, the amount of 
capital required to start a company has declined, available capital has increased, and information 
about building a startup has become widely available, prompting VCs “to compete for the right to 
fund entrepreneurs”); Pollman, Private Company Boards, supra note 122, at 635-39 (describing how 
entrepreneurs are advised to be selective in the board members they “hire”); Anu Hariharan, How 
to Manage a Board, Y COMBINATOR (July 15, 2019), https://blog.ycombinator.com/how-to-manage-
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pressures that began in the early 2000s, explaining that “[w]hereas once too 
many start-ups chased limited amounts of capital from a relatively small 
number of VC firms, today, some would argue, too much capital is chasing too 
few quality start-ups.”257 
This dynamic can put investors in a position in which they hold a board 
seat, but it is not in their individual interest to exercise their power as a strict 
monitor. Early investors get board seats that they might not be willing to give 
up even when their ability to add value has passed.258 They may be subject to 
competitive and reputational constraints that encourage them to adopt 
founder-friendly stances, both in order to remain in a founder’s good graces 
to participate in subsequent rounds and to maintain reputations that will give 
them access to other companies’ deals.259 Among the highest echelon of 
startups, the “fire-the-founder” era of the twentieth century evolved into a 
“founder-friendly” era of the twenty-first.260 And, if founders maintain 
control past the early part of a startup’s lifecycle, they may be unlikely to give 
it up even as needs and expectations change for the board from managerial to 
monitoring. Some of the hottest startups have their choice of investors and 
bargaining leverage to demand favorable terms.261 
Entrepreneurs and VCs alike have noted the weak oversight that can arise 
from the overlapping roles in the governance structure. For example, the CEO 
of online real-estate brokerage Redfin, which went public in 2017, remarked, 
“There is a new world of VCs who really can’t perform their governance 
functions on boards because they want to preserve their relationship with 
 
a-board [https://perma.cc/PSR7-GFBS] (suggesting founders conduct reference checks on potential 
board members); supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
257 Blank, supra note 239, at 99-100. 
258 See, e.g., Adam Epstein, Comment to Jessica E. Lessin, The Private Tech Board Crisis and 
What to Do About It, THE INFO. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/the-
private-tech-board-crisis-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/NDP7-6ZGZ] (describing 
frequent experience with “pre-IPO boardrooms where the Series A & B investors are: (1) no longer 
remotely expert in a business that has pivoted numerous times . . .; (2) are on 7-10 other boards in 
addition to being full time investors . . .; and (3) have no formal governance training whatsoever 
and/or loathe board service.”); Thomas Lee, Stretched Thin: Venture Capitalists Serve On Too Many 
Boards, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Stretched-thin-
Venture-capitalists-serve-on-too-11966545.php [https://perma.cc/8MTJ-9EZT] (quoting a VC 
noting that sitting on unicorn boards can make a VC look good and “open doors”). 
259 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 239, at 99 (discussing the emergence of “‘founder friendly’ VCs” 
with competitive advantage in marketing). VCs may also recognize that an exit through a sale of the 
company is far likelier than an IPO, and having a founder retain a leadership role can make a deal 
more attractive to acquirers. Id. 
260 Id. at 96-97, 99.  
261 See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text; see also Jessica E. Lessin, The Private Tech 
Board Crisis and What to Do About It, THE INFO. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.theinformation.com/
articles/the-private-tech-board-crisis-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/NDP7-6ZGZ] 
(“As long as demand for great companies outstrips supply, some investors will back any company 
with growth potential, regardless of its governance standards.”). 
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you.”262 Similarly, Benchmark general partner Bill Gurley stated, “There’s a 
systematic problem in Silicon Valley[:] the venture capitalist board members 
are finding [it] harder and harder to speak up and hold entrepreneurs 
responsible for financial performance.”263 He explained, “Our business has 
gotten super competitive. What the venture capitalist is afraid of is losing the 
next big one . . . . [Y]ears ago [some of the best venture capitalists] were 
known for storming into board rooms [to demand fiduciary responsibility]—
if you get a reputation like that you won’t win the next deal.”264 He lamented 
that Silicon Valley board rooms have mostly become applauding audiences of 
clapping hands.265 
Although some observers may have little sympathy for VCs who lose 
money due to oversight failure, it is not only VCs who bear the cost of weak 
startup boards and compliance failures.266 Particularly egregious examples 
such as the blood-testing scandal at Theranos, which harmed not only investors 
and employees but also innocent third-party patients, put the concern into 
sharp relief.267 
Yet the potential for oversight weakness stems from the underlying 
governance structure and is not easily resolved. Founder-friendly terms 
exacerbate the issue, and unicorn size raises the stakes, but the structure and 
dynamics that contribute to the oversight weakness are commonplace in 
venture-backed startups.268 
 
262 Winkler & Farrell, supra note 149. 
263 Matthew Lynley, Very Famous VC Bill Gurley Says Startup Boardrooms Are Now Just Filled 
With *Clapping Hand Noise*, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/14/
very-famous-vc-bill-gurley-says-startup-boardrooms-are-now-just-filled-with-clapping-hand-noise/ 
[https://perma.cc/3YH7-8VGM]. 
264 Id. (second and third alterations in original). 
265 Id. 
266 See Martin Kenney & John Zysman, Unicorns, Cheshire Cats, and the New Dilemmas of 
Entrepreneurial Finance, 21 VENTURE CAP. 35, 39 (2019) (observing that with large amounts of 
private capital available, “money-losing firms can continue operating and undercutting incumbents 
for far longer than previously—effectively creating disruption without generating profit” and that 
“in some cases, they may be destroying social value”). 
267 Another issue is that companies and regulators may not fully appreciate the social risks and 
costs of new technology until some time after deployment. John Armour et al., Putting Technology to 
Good Use for Society: The Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law, 6 J. BRIT. ACAD. 285, 294-95 
(2018). 
268 This point reflects that while worthy of attention, the governance issues that unicorns 
manifest do not spring into existence only when these companies cross the line of a billion-dollar 
valuation, and notably the valuations may be unreliable markers. See Robert P. Bartlett III, A 
Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect Start-Up 
Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 123, 123-24 (Claire A. Hill 
& Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (explaining that the stated valuations of unicorns may be 
unreliable measures of firm value because they reflect preferred stock terms); Gornall & Strebulaev, 
supra note 78, at 1 (modeling the valuation of unicorns and finding that after adjusting for valuation-
inflating terms, almost half of unicorns lose their status). 
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Independent directors who do not hold overlapping roles have the 
potential to improve the monitoring function of startup boards.269 Recent 
reports and advice from former SEC chair Mary Jo White and former 
attorney general Eric Holder indeed call on mature startups to enhance board 
oversight by adding independent directors and installing an independent 
board chair.270 In previous periods when startups went public earlier on 
average, much of the company’s growth phase could have been funded by 
public capital markets and overseen by a public company board with greater 
independence. Proposals concerning independence, particularly for late-stage 
startups, can thus be understood as efforts to move startup boards to a model 
closer to that of public company boards and previous expectations about the 
publicness of companies with a sizeable footprint.271 
But, as the description of startup boards in subsection II.A.1 explains, not 
all startups have independent directors and those that do typically use them as 
a means of providing for shared control of the board between VCs and 
founders.272 One study of independent directors found that rather than 
monitoring management, independent directors in startups “arbitrate disputes 
between entrepreneurs and investors” and act as a commitment mechanism 
forcing compromise between directors and limiting threats of opportunism.273 
Further, not only may the independent director be envisioned more as a 
tie-breaker than a monitor, the meaning of independence in the startup 
context is in many ways narrower than public company norms—it often refers 
simply to an individual who is not an inside manager such as a founder or 
executive and not a major outside investor such as a VC. Independent 
 
269 Empirical studies have not, however, definitively established a link between board 
independence and corporate profitability or stock price performance. Fisch, Boards, supra note 53, at 
276 (stating that “evidence demonstrating a relationship between independence and profitability is 
in short supply”); Langevoort, supra note 162, at 798 (describing how “a growing body of economics 
research has been unable to find any such connection,” while conceding that “measurement problems 
plague empirical work in this area”). 
270 See Uber Report: Eric Holder’s Recommendations for Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/uber-report-eric-holders-recommendations-for-
change.html [https://perma.cc/JP94-DBP5] (recommending the addition of independent board 
members, an independent chair of the board, and an oversight committee); White, supra note 42 
(calling on entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to ask whether mature startups are including on 
their boards “outsiders with larger, and ideally public, company experience”). 
271 For discussions of the concept of “publicness,” see Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29, 
at 383; Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 138-39 
(2011). 
272 See Broughman, supra note 142, at 461-64 (considering the role of independent directors in 
venture-backed startups); supra subsection II.A.1; see also Lessin, supra note 25861 (criticizing notable 
unicorns for failing to appoint independent directors). 
273 Broughman, supra note 142, at 461, 464 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fried 
& Ganor, supra note 13, at 989 (noting that VCs often have considerable influence over 
independent directors). 
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directors in the startup context may still have significant social and 
professional ties with the VCs, founders, or executives. These connections can 
add enormous value to the startup and establish the trust necessary to have a 
voice on the board,274 but could at the same time influence their ability to 
provide oversight. In addition, not only does independence have a narrower 
meaning in the startup context, the information generally available to these 
directors in carrying out their board service is also limited by the lack of 
public reporting and stock exchange price. 
And, finally, unless a startup reaches maturity without being acquired and 
begins to prepare for an IPO exit, there may be little incentive for 
participants to cede control and build an independent, public-company-style 
board. Founders value the ability to pursue their vision for the company; VCs 
appreciate founders’ ability to create an innovative culture and also want their 
own seat on the board.275 Control, and the many ways to divide, balance, and 
share it through board governance and contract, are a central and ongoing 
concern for startup participants. One examination of the practices of thirty 
prominent venture-backed private tech companies found that only about half 
of these companies had any independent directors—companies such as 
Stripe, Instacart, Reddit, SpaceX, and 23andMe had none despite valuations 
over one billion dollars.276 Without having to comply with stock exchange 
rules or federal regulations pertaining to public companies, there is little 
impetus apart from the preferences of founders and VCs. New entrants to 
late-stage investing, such as mutual funds, could have a voice to push for 
governance improvements, but this force remains to be seen in the startup 
context. 
In sum, this Article’s analysis highlights that VCs may not always be the 
strong monitors they are assumed to be, and that adding some measure of 
 
274 See, e.g., Emilio J. Castilla et al., Social Networks in Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON VALLEY 
EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 218, 245 (Chong-Moon Lee et 
al. eds., 2000) (describing the “crucial importance of social networks” to the “flow of people, 
resources, and information” in Silicon Valley startups); Scott Shane & Daniel Cable, Network Ties, 
Reputation, and the Financing of New Ventures, 48 MGMT. SCI. 364, 377 (2002) (finding that social ties 
influence venture financing). See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. 
SOC. 1360 (1973) (examining the importance of weak social ties in diffusion of influence, 
information, and talent). 
275 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 48, at 128-38 (describing the role of entrepreneur as 
innovator); Blank, supra note 239, at 96 (“The decline of IPOs and less focus on management 
credentials have reduced the need for ‘adult supervision,’ and VCs have come to respect founders’ 
ability to maintain a fast-moving, innovative culture.”); Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 117, at 565-
66, 577-79 (describing the entrepreneur’s “idiosyncratic vision” and the value of controlling 
management decisions to pursue such vision under conditions of information asymmetry or 
differences of opinion). 
276 Private Tech Governance: Best and Worst, THE INFO. (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.theinformation.com/corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/78KW-6VD2]. 
 
2019] Startup Governance 209 
greater independence may improve the oversight function of startup boards. 
This proposal is unlikely to be a panacea, however, because the system of 
startup governance is not oriented around such a goal; rather, insiders’ vision, 
shared control, and social ties provide value for growing, innovative 
companies. Accountability mechanisms other than board oversight may take 
on greater importance as the social costs of startups are increasingly felt in 
communities around the world. 
2. Extreme Late-Stage Governance and Liquidity Pressure 
While startup scandals and monitoring failures have captured headlines, 
another issue has attracted considerable academic attention. In just two 
decades, the number of publicly listed U.S. companies has plummeted by 
nearly half and the number of companies going public through an IPO has 
decreased to roughly one-third.277 Scholars and commentators have debated 
the role that regulatory costs, securities law changes, technology, and public 
market dynamics may have played in these developments, and whether 
companies still have incentives to go public.278 
Drawing on the framework of startup governance set out in Part II, this 
Section contributes a novel, supplementary explanation of why some 
companies might choose to go public even when they do not need to raise 
money: increasing governance costs and liquidity pressure from 
heterogeneous shareholders. Staying private for long periods while growing 
and adding participants with diverging interests involves significant 
governance complexity. Going public offers a chance to unwind a complicated 
and largely contractual governance structure in favor of a more traditional 
 
277 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public 
Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 454 (2017) (“From 2001 through 2012, there were an average of 
only 99 IPOs per year, compared to 310 IPOs per year between 1980 and 2000.”); Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, C.E.O.s Meet in Secrecy Over the Sorry State of Public Companies, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/dealbook/ceos-meet-in-secret-over-sorry-state-of-
public-companies.html [https://perma.cc/98EY-QSPX] (“In 1996, there were 8,025 public listed 
companies in the United States; by 2012, the number of companies was about half: 4,101, according 
to the National Bureau of Economic Research.”); Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, Is the U.S. 
Public Corporation in Trouble? 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 495/2017, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2869301 [https://perma.cc/A9L3-
TFQW] (“The steady decrease in the number of listed firms since 1997 has resulted from both low 
numbers of newly listed firms and high numbers of delists . . . . [T]he average yearly number of 
IPOs after 2000 is roughly one-third of the average from 1980 to 2000.”). 
278 See, e.g., De Fontenay, supra note 277, at 447, 453-58; Kahle & Stulz, supra note 277, at 1; see 
also Brian R. Cheffins, Rumours of the Death of the American Public Company Are Greatly Exaggerated 
22-23 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 444/2019, 2019) (arguing that based 
on the “ratio of aggregate market capitalization of publicly traded stocks to gross domestic product,” 
the public company is “currently as important relative to the U.S. economy as it ever has been, if 
not more so”). 
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allocation of rights and responsibilities. Even dual-class stock can represent a 
considerable simplification over the complex multi-class structures and 
contracts of late-stage startup companies.279 
Historically, the key reason for companies to go public was for broader 
access to capital.280 For some companies this may still be a significant 
motivation, but many unicorns have demonstrated that they can raise large 
amounts of capital without accessing public markets.281 
Liquidity is also commonly listed as a reason to go public, but its 
importance is usually explained as increasing the value of equity and lowering 
the cost of capital for companies to make acquisitions and hire and retain 
managers and employees.282 Some scholars have additionally recognized that 
going public is an important form of exit for venture-backed companies, 
serving as a “mechanism for founders, employees, and early investors to cash 
out their relatively illiquid stakes in the firm.”283 What remains 
underappreciated, however, are the governance dynamics occurring in these 
late-stage companies that can be difficult to navigate and make liquidity 
pressure particularly problematic, especially for employees.284 
 
279 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (finding that unicorns have an average of eight 
share classes and layered contracts between a wide mix of equity holders including founders, 
employees, VC funds, mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, corporate investors, and others). 
280 De Fontenay, supra note 277, at 461; see John Koeplin et al., The Private Company Discount, 
12 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 94, 99 n.10 (2000) (noting “relatively less access to capital for private 
firms”); Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market 
Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 1-2 (1986) (repeating 
the “frequently encountered hypothesis regarding the value of a major stock exchange listing . . . 
that improved liquidity provided by exchange trading stimulates demand for a firm’s stock, which, 
in turn, gives rise to a permanent increase in stock price”). 
281 De Fontenay, supra note 277, at 447. 
282 Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 536-37 (2012). 
283 De Fontenay, supra note 277, at 461; see also Black & Gilson, supra note 255, at 245 (arguing 
that “a well developed stock market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an [IPO] is 
critical to the existence of a vibrant venture capital market”); Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the 
Decision to Go Public, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 293 (1994) (“Venture capitalists, who specialize in 
providing funds to privately held firms, generate the bulk of their profits from firms that go 
public.”); Armin Schwienbacher, Innovation and Venture Capital Exits, 118 ECON. J. 1888, 1888 (2008) 
(recognizing that “[s]ince most high-tech start-ups initially do not generate profits to pay dividends 
or buy back shares, the exit route is the primary way the venture capitalist can realise a positive 
return on the investment”). Researchers have also examined reputational motivations and the benefit 
of allowing founders to diversify their private holdings and regain control over firms. Jay B. Kesten, 
The Law and Economics of the Going-Public Decision, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF IPOS 27, 28-
29 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2018) (summarizing literature on the potential benefits of going public). 
284 When Facebook went public in 2012, it listed employee liquidity as one of the principal 
purposes of its IPO. Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 7 (Feb. 1, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9KLS-MMWD] (“The principal purposes of our initial public offering are to 
create a public market for our Class A common stock and thereby enable future access to the public 
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Recall from Part I the late-stage mature startup’s financial and governance 
structure that is characterized by extreme complexity—these companies are 
increasingly raising financing rounds of previously unheard-of size, bringing 
new public-style investors into the capital structure.285 Part II observes that 
these startups can be plagued by tensions between and among all participants 
and in a pattern that increases. This raises the question of what is the ultimate 
endpoint. Most startups fail or reach an exit through a sale of the company.286 
But what happens to the companies that have not taken this path? 
We are currently witnessing the answer to this question play out. To date, 
the structure of venture-backed companies has been premised on the notion 
that there must ultimately be an exit.287 Key participants rely on the 
assumption that exit is an essential goal. VC funds have a fixed life, usually 
ten years and sometimes with an option for a short extension.288 Incentive-
based equity compensation for employees usually vests over four years and 
typically has a term of ten years from the date of grant.289 
Extended periods of staying private have strained these timelines and 
prompted new mechanisms to give partial liquidity: secondary markets for 
private company stock, third-party tender offers, and company-sponsored 
share buybacks.290 These are important developments that provide a release 
valve for participants’ liquidity needs and governance conflicts. For example, 
Benchmark’s lawsuit against Uber’s cofounder and former CEO ultimately 
settled as part of a deal that also brought in a new institutional investor, gave 
partial liquidity to Benchmark, and restructured the board.291 Palantir, a data 
analytics startup, conducted a $225 million buyback, offering to repurchase up 
to 12.5 percent of certain employees’ shares.292 But these transactions also 
create new risks and challenges that must be managed and it is an open 
 
equity markets by us and our employees, obtain additional capital, and facilitate an orderly 
distribution of shares for the selling stockholders.”). 
285 See supra subsections I.B.2 & II.B. 
286 See VC Director Guide, supra note 59, at 3 (“Historically, the majority of . . . liquidity events 
occur through mergers and acquisitions.”). 
287 See Zider, supra note 57, at 132 (“Venture money is not long-term money. The idea is to 
invest in a company’s balance sheet and infrastructure until it reaches a sufficient size and credibility 
so that it can be sold to a corporation or so that the institutional public-equity markets can step in 
and provide liquidity.”); Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 345 (“Exit is not merely optional for 
venture capitalists.”). 
288 Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 12, at 345. 
289 MAYNARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 340-41. Another type of stock-based compensation, 
restricted stock units, usually expire after five to seven years. Lee, supra note 5. 
290 See supra note 110. 
291 See supra notes 176–179 and accompanying text. 
292 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Palantir Buyback Plan Shows Need for New Silicon Valley Pay 
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question whether it will be sustainable for startups to remain private 
forever—whether, for example, companies can find new investors large 
enough to satisfy all liquidity needs on a continual basis and that do not 
demand assurances of a timeline to go public. 
Staying private in the extreme late stage involves significant governance 
difficulty and cost. Raising new rounds of financing requires complex 
renegotiations among an increasingly diverse group of shareholders. It often 
raises the bar for a potential exit down the road, for example, by giving 
protective terms to the newest investors regarding the price and timing of an 
IPO that guarantees them a return, potentially at the expense of founders, 
employees, and earlier investors.293 Taking on additional capital can also 
reduce the number of potential acquirers that would have the means and 
interest to buy the company in a trade sale. 
Further, companies are limited in the types of workers they can grant 
“compensatory” equity under federal securities laws exemptions.294 While 
private, Uber and Airbnb, for example, asked the SEC to change the rules to 
allow drivers, hosts, and other gig economy workers to receive equity from 
startups.295 The issue only arises for private companies—once public, they 
can simply register the shares. 
Managing information within the private governance structure also 
becomes increasingly challenging. State corporate law provides shareholders 
with the right to inspect the corporate books and records.296 This right 
provides startup employees and other shareholders with an important 
protection and means of seeking information to value their stock, but it is 
potentially costly and time-consuming for companies to respond to these 
 
293 See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also KOPP & GANZ, supra note 66, at 25 
(quoting venture capitalist John Doerr of Kleiner Perkins: “Having a $1 billion valuation can be a 
real problem . . . [.] Being a unicorn is really an albatross.”). 
294 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(c) (2018). 
295 Comment Letter from Danielle Burr, Head of Federal Affairs, Uber Technologies, Inc., to 
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-
18/s71818-4510185-175992.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK6N-GDKG] (“Uber believes that individuals 
who get work through the entrepreneurial economy should be able to receive securities pursuant to 
an exempt offering under Rule 701 [17 CFR § 230.701] and also through a registered offering on 
Form S-8 from the companies with whom they partner.”); Comment Letter from Rob Chesnut, 
General Counsel, Airbnb, Inc., to U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-18/s71818-4403356-175575.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVU2-P7F4] 
(“We believe that an update to 17 CFR 230.701 (“Rule 701”) is necessary to reflect the evolving nature 
of how individuals earn income.”). 
296 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 1601(a) (2019) (“The accounting books, records, and minutes of 
proceedings of the shareholders and the board . . . shall be open to inspection . . . upon the written 
demand on the corporation of any shareholder . . . for a purpose reasonably related to the holder’s 
interests as a shareholder.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (2019) (“Any stockholder, in person or by 
attorney or other agent, shall . . . have the right . . . to inspect for any proper purpose . . . [t]he 
corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records.”). 
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requests.297 In addition, federal securities law requires companies that grant 
more than $10 million of options or other employee equity awards in a twelve-
month period to provide detailed financial statements and risk disclosures to 
their employees.298 The SEC levied a civil penalty on Credit Karma, a 
personal finance startup, for failing to comply—the company had the 
information available, but did not want to provide it to employees due to 
confidentiality concerns.299 Companies are in a bind: employees are making 
investment decisions and are entitled to the information, but a company may 
suffer when sensitive financial information is leaked. As companies get bigger 
and stay private longer, avoiding leaks becomes harder. 
Partial liquidity events are often problematic. Secondary trading can be 
time-consuming and distracting for managers and employees—whose time 
and attention are key resources for company performance and value.300 
Because unrestricted secondary trading poses problems for startups in 
managing their shareholder base and valuation,301 startup lawyers added 
trading restrictions that prevent employees and other shareholders from 
selling without company consent.302 Although this alleviates certain concerns, 
 
297 See Jeremy Quittner, A Little-Known Rule Could Force Startups to Divulge Financial  
Info, FORTUNE (May 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/26/startups-financial-info 
[https://perma.cc/L467-7JMQ] (noting that “[a]nswering the queries is potentially costly and time-
consuming for the company, which could be subject to multiple such letters”); Rolfe Winkler, Former 
Employee Wins Legal Feud to Open Up Startup’s Books, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2017) (discussing litigation 
in which a former startup employee succeeded in obtaining corporate financial records to value his 
shares), https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-employee-wins-legal-feud-to-open-up-startups-
books-1485435602 [https://perma.cc/234B-BZW6]. 
298 Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,940, 34,940 
(July 24, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). The threshold was raised from five million dollars 
in a twelve-month period. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e) (2018). 
299 Michael S. Dicke & Vincent Barredo, SEC Fines Private Company in First Enforcement Action 




300 See, e.g., A Legal Guide To Secondaries: What Startups Need to Know About Employee Tender 
Offers, FOUNDERS CIRCLE, http://www.founderscircle.com/legal-guide-to-secondaries [https://
perma.cc/2YND-ANFU] (“What if all of your employees start keeping daily tabs on the current 
price per share of their stock? What if they start asking for company information that it doesn’t want 
to provide and potentially feed to prospective buyers? What if they sell to competitors?”). 
301 See id. (noting that secondary transactions can “create some unwanted chaos” by affecting 
the company’s option pricing and shareholder base); see also Pollman, Information Issues, supra note 
37, at 213-14 (discussing concerns about managing shareholders and pricing issues). 
302 Schwartz, supra note 282, at 559-60; Katie Benner, Airbnb and Others Set Terms for Employees 
to Cash Out, N.Y. TIMES (Aug, 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/technology/airbnb-
and-others-set-terms-for-employees-to-cash-out.html [https://perma.cc/FU2Q-HUK5]; see Kupor, 
supra note 226 (discussing transfer restrictions on startup stock); see also Henry v. Phixios Holdings, 
Inc., C.A. No. 12504-VCMR, 2017 WL 2928034, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 10, 2017) (discussing the 
enforceability of transfer restrictions). 
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it puts directors, founders, and executives in further tension with other 
startup participants as they are deciding which shareholders are allowed to 
sell, and when they do, it often necessitates information disclosures in 
addition to company consent.303 
Similar concerns about distractions, fairness, and disclosures arise when a 
company does a buyback or facilitates a third-party tender offer.304 Palantir’s 
share buyback put the company in the position of picking and choosing 
among current and former employees to offer partial liquidity at a price above 
the valuation that one of its institutional shareholders, Morgan Stanley, had 
determined in a markdown.305 Different pricing and terms for investors and 
employees are commonplace in private tender offers.306 Company-facilitated 
transactions expose corporate decisionmakers and the corporation itself to 
litigation and regulatory risk from potential pricing and information 
asymmetry issues.307 Further, third-party tender offers may pose problems for 
the company post-exit. More than one hundred special purpose vehicles had 
reportedly invested in Uber before its IPO, which may have precipitated a 
market selloff after the company became publicly traded.308 
In addition, a lengthy list of problems for startup employees in particular 
can arise from the extended pre-liquidity period. The discussion in Section 
II.A explained problems arising from expiring exercise periods and how it 
can put common shareholders in tension with each other. Some companies 
have turned to giving cash bonuses instead of options and loaning employees 
money to exercise their options,309 but these solutions are costly, complicated, 
 
303 See Pollman, Information Issues, supra note 37, at 213-15 (discussing company disclosures in 
secondary transactions); see also supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
304 Dawn Belt, Practice Note, Pre-IPO Liquidity for Late Stage Start-Ups, LEXIS PRACTICE 
ADVISOR (2018), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Pre-IPO-Liquidity-for-Late-
Stage-Start-Up.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S22-JR4P]; Private Company Secondary Liquidity— 
Private Tender Offer Disclosures, NASDAQ PRIVATE MARKET (Sept. 8, 2017), https://
www.nasdaqprivatemarket.com/private-company-secondary-liquidity-private-tender-offer-
disclosures [https://perma.cc/X797-MKCP]. 
305 Davidoff Solomon, supra note 292. 
306 Factors to Consider When Structuring Private Tender Offers, NASDAQ PRIVATE MARKET (Jan. 
21, 2018), https://www.nasdaqprivatemarket.com/factors-to-consider-when-structuring-private-
tender-offers [https://perma.cc/SSS2-J8WF]. 
307 See Pollman, Information Issues, supra note 37, at 238-39. 
308 Alistair Barr, One Theory Why Lyft, Uber IPOs Flopped: Special Purpose Vehicles, BLOOMBERG 
(May 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/one-theory-why-lyft-uber-
ipos-flopped-special-purpose-vehicles [https://perma.cc/ZEA4-TTUZ]. 
309 Ted G. Wang, Playing with Fire: Loans to Exercise Options, FENWICK & WEST LLP  
(June 24, 2014), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/playing-with-fire-loans-to-exercise-
options.aspx [https://perma.cc/XRD3-R3LH]; Olivia Zaleski, Airbnb Calms Employees with Cash 
Bonuses, Releases New Details on IPO, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-06-28/airbnb-calms-employees-with-cash-bonuses-releases-new-details-on-ipo 
[https://perma.cc/A5MV-EQ25]. A new cottage industry is also emerging, of third-party companies 
and funds making loans to startup employees and relying on their stock as collateral. Alfred Lee, 
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and only underscore the need for a better system that aligns company and 
employee interests. 
In the meanwhile, employees risk getting hurt in the process. In startups, 
option exercise requires out-of-pocket money to cover the exercise price and 
taxes. The more valuable the options, the more expensive it is to exercise 
them, and coming up with the cash can be difficult for employees—it can 
sometimes run in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.310 Once the options 
are exercised they become shares of (semi) illiquid common stock and it 
remains to be seen what they will be worth. Some companies fail or ultimately 
exit at an unfavorable valuation. 
For example, when Good Technology sold to BlackBerry after a cancelled 
IPO and having turned down a much higher acquisition offer, employees 
discovered their stock was valued at 44 cents per share, down from $4.32 a year 
earlier.311 Although Good Technology had at one time been labeled a unicorn 
valued at more than $1 billion, its final sale price was $425 million and most of 
the proceeds went to the preferred shareholders.312 Many employees were 
stuck with large losses and tax bills, and they subsequently sued the directors 
for breach of fiduciary duty.313 This example reflects the classic principle that 
equity comes with risk, but it also shows something more particular to 
startups—the governance cost of exposing large numbers of employees to 
personal financial harm and, consequently, key managers to litigation. 
Nothing in this discussion suggests that there is only one reason to go 
public or that the impetus will be the same for all companies. Instead, this 
discussion adds depth to understanding the governance costs and liquidity 
pressure that develop in the extreme late stage of startups. The framework 
 
Back in Vogue, Tech Lending Funds Cater to Pre-IPO Workers, THE INFO. (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/back-in-vogue-tech-lending-funds-cater-to-pre-ipo-
workers [https://perma.cc/8PW3-QQZ7]. 
310 See Matt Levine, Work for Uber, Wind Up in Debt, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-13/work-for-uber-wind-up-in-debt [https://
perma.cc/LNV8-SJGW] (describing one former Uber employee’s $100,000 payment to exercise 
20,000 stock options). 




313 Id.; Matt Levine, Good Technology Wasn’t So Good For Employees, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 
2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-23/good-technology-wasn-t-so-good-for-
employees [https://perma.cc/RB64-UHT2]; see Helaine Olen, These Startup Workers Thought Their 
Company Stock Would Make Them Rich. Instead They Got Worthless Shares and Massive Tax Bills, SLATE 
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/12/23/good_technology_workers_
thought_their_stock_would_make_them_rich_nope.html [https://perma.cc/JU8L-2QE7] (noting 
that “even as corporate honchos were aware that an ‘outside appraisal firm’ had priced the firm’s 
common stock at 88 cents a share in June, employees were still purchasing company stock at $3.34 a 
share in August”). 
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offered here suggests that we can expect increasing complexity to remaining 
private and an ownership structure of different types of participants with 
vesting and investing timelines that can be delayed, but will eventually push 
toward an exit.314 
B. Applying Corporate Law 
In addition to illuminating current issues of debate such as monitoring 
failures and late-stage startups, this Article’s framework also suggests that 
more attention be paid to how corporate law might adapt in the future to 
account for startups. Foundational doctrines have been shaped in the context 
of classic closely held problems of majority–minority disputes and the public 
corporation context of shareholder-manager agency costs.315 High-growth, 
innovative startups funded by venture capital present different features and 
issues. 
This final section aims to start a conversation about how to apply 
traditional corporate law doctrine to startups. It takes as a key example In re 
Trados, discussed above in Section II.A, regarding the conflict that can arise 
between the common and preferred shareholders.316 
The case involved a startup that faced dim prospects for growth after 
several years of operation in which it had taken on multiple rounds of 
preferred stock having an aggregate liquidation preference of approximately 
$58 million.317 As is typical for a startup by this stage of its life cycle, the board 
had been renegotiated such that the preferred shareholders and company 
 
314 The recent batch of IPOs and direct listings, including companies that reached late-stage 
maturity such as Uber, Lyft, Zoom, Pinterest, Spotify, and Slack, evidence this possibility of 
governance complexity and liquidity pressure pushing toward going public. For example, the digital 
music service company Spotify and the software messaging company Slack both went public without 
selling a single new share and prioritized giving immediate liquidity to all existing shareholders, 
without lock-up provisions that normally delay employees in accessing the market. Alexander F. 
Cohen et al., Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing, LATHAM & WATKINS 
(June 21, 2018), https://www.lw.com/spotify-case-study [https://perma.cc/ZR85-GKXF]; Maureen 
Farrell, Slack Plans to Follow Spotify on Unconventional IPO Route, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-planning-to-pursue-direct-listing-11547202723 [https://
perma.cc/HK2K-X8WE]; Ellen Huet, Slack Tops $19 Billion Value in Trading Debut After Shunning 
IPO, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-20/slack-
ceo-says-no-lockup-no-cash-drew-company-to-direct-listing [https://perma.cc/QMK5-GU26]. 
315 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 185 (Del. 
1986) (ruling in the public corporation context that when a sale of the company becomes inevitable, 
the duty of the board is to maximize the corporation’s value by getting the best price available for 
the shareholders); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998) 
(tracing to the closely held corporation context the development of the fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders). 
316 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 47 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
317 Id. at 20-25. 
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executives composed the board, together with one independent industry 
expert.318 The legal dispute concerned the board’s decision to sell the 
company to a strategic buyer for $60 million—an amount that went to the 
preferred shareholders in light of their liquidation preference and to 
management under a management incentive plan that provided select 
executives with a bonus to find and carry out the deal.319 The question was 
whether, in negotiating and approving a sale that gave the common 
shareholders nothing, the directors breached their fiduciary duty.320 
The court held that the directors owed a fiduciary duty to the common 
shareholders as the residual claimants.321 It characterized the preferred 
shareholders as having rights and preferences that are only contractual in 
nature like creditors rather than residual claimants—“the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the firm’s value.”322 As a majority of the directors were VCs 
and executives whom the court deemed not disinterested and independent, 
the court applied the entire fairness standard, “Delaware’s most onerous 
standard.”323 It found the process lacking because the board members “did not 
understand that their job was to maximize the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of the common stockholders” and failed to form an independent 
committee that would represent the common shareholders.324 It further 
found, however, that the common stock had no economic value due to the 
corporation’s weak prospects, and thus the common shareholders had received 
their fair value.325 Fortunately for the defendants, they had no liability in the 
case, but commentators pointed out that the court’s application of the entire 
fairness standard had resulted in years of litigation and posed concerns for 
future potential litigants.326 
Most critically, Trados sets out a vision of fiduciary principles that imagines 
that all directors have an immutable obligation to maximize value for common 
shareholders. This does not accord with the reality of most startups, which do 
not have homogeneous shareholders, even among the common stock class. 
 
318 See id. at 45-55 (outlining the conflicts of interest faced by six of the seven directors). 
319 Id. at 20, 26-33. 
320 Id. at 33-35. 
321 Id. at 40-41. 
322 Id. at 39-41. 
323 Id. at 44-45. 
324 Id. at 62, 64-65. 
325 Id. at 76. 
326 See KUPOR, supra note 36, at 228 (noting the litigants “spent a ton of time and money on 
legal fees on this case, so there were real costs,” and that “an entrepreneur or a VC [wouldn’t] want 
to hang [their] hat on the fair price part of this analysis” because “the chances are pretty good that 
any given court on any given day could come to a different conclusion”); Abraham J.B. Cable, Does 
Trados Matter?, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 12-16) (on file with author) (discussing 
the response to Trados by legal practitioners, the venture capital community, and academics). 
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Although there might be special concerns about the potential vulnerability of 
some common shareholders such as employees, the common shareholders do 
not represent the firm value or an undifferentiated residual as imagined. 
Instead, the common shareholders represent only a segment of the equity and 
they often stand in tension with each other and have other forms of affiliation 
with the corporation in addition to their shareholding.327 
Furthermore, the preferred shareholders often play a key role in 
governance and do not fit the typical paradigm of creditors that have 
negotiated their contractual relationship at arm’s length and without the 
expectation of other involvement, protections, or equity-like investment 
returns.328 Because of uncertainty and the non-contractibility of certain types 
of potential issues in startups, preferred shareholders do not have complete 
protection from opportunism through their contracts.329 VCs and 
entrepreneurs frequently use a governance system of shared control to resolve 
matters in the boardroom, which allows for decisions to be made as events 
unfold rather than by advance specification and for boards to function 
collaboratively on strategy and innovation.330 Preferred shareholders’ ability 
to use shared control as an alternative to contract is undermined by an 
immutable legal rule that requires maximization for the common 
shareholders. Trados could discourage venture capital investment through 
corporations or raise the cost of capital to innovative startups.331 
The features of startup governance suggest that courts should be willing 
to apply fiduciary doctrine more flexibly in this context to recognize the 
different types of contributions represented in the corporation and that the 
board is repeatedly renegotiated on the path to an eventual exit. The value of 
the corporation itself, the site of these investments and bargains, best reflects 
the sum of the participants’ interests and it is to the corporation that the 
fiduciary duty should be owed. 
 
327 See supra subsection II.A.2. 
328 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 13, at 1815 (arguing that “preferred stock is both corporate 
and contractual—neither all one nor all the other”). 
329 See Bratton, supra note 12, at 894 (explaining that preferred shareholders in startups 
typically have “incomplete protection from issuer opportunism”); supra subsections II.A.1.a, II.A.1.c, 
II.A.2.a–b (describing governance conflicts involving preferred shareholders). 
330 See supra subsection II.A.1 (discussing shared control in startups). 
331 See Sepe, Constituency Directors, supra note 27, at 311-12 (arguing that current fiduciary 
doctrine concerning constituency directors could reduce corporate access to capital); Cable, supra 
note 326, at 1, 22-40 (finding that “Silicon Valley lawyers describe modest effects” of the Trados 
decision on practice to date). 
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Over time, with increasing numbers of participants with diverging 
interests,332 it becomes even harder to engage in bargaining toward an optimal 
outcome and even more important to allow the board to act as it best 
understands the interests of the corporation as a whole. To do otherwise limits 
the utility of the corporate form for a sector that has generated some of the 
world’s most valuable companies. This explanation, grounded in understanding 
startup governance, bolsters other efficiency-based arguments that Trados can 
lead to suboptimal outcomes that fail to maximize the firm value.333 
In addition, when disputes end up in litigation, courts should recognize 
that corporate law’s standard approach to conflicts, such as giving judicial 
deference to decisions made by a disinterested majority or committee of the 
board, is often not possible in the startup context.334 Most participants in the 
startup lack independence by design. Directors will unavoidably be conflicted 
in many cases.335 “Independent” directors typically have social ties in the 
entrepreneurship community.336 These social ties and networks are a valuable 
resource for startups to mobilize the talent, information, and investments 
needed to grow an innovative company.337 Social and professional connections 
also often create the trust necessary for VCs and entrepreneurs to invite an 
independent director to the board, a practice that should be encouraged as 
discussed in subsection III.A.1 concerning oversight. Further, courts should 
 
332 See supra subsection III.A.2 (discussing late-stage governance complexity and the 
increasing number of heterogeneous participants, including large institutional investors and 
employees). 
333 See Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 13, at 295 (arguing that Trados “risk[s] 
undermining the utility of the corporate form as a vehicle for maximizing firm value”); Bratton, 
supra note 12, at 945 (“When disputes between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs come to court, 
a rote presumption favoring the common stockholder is not defensible on efficiency grounds.”); 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 13, at 1905 (“Given two classes of equity, the interests of which 
conflict, enterprise value maximization works better as the default norm.”). 
334 Under current doctrine, director defendants in startups typically face the burden of 
demonstrating entire fairness, which tends to preclude dismissal at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., 
Mehta v. Mobile Posse, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0355-KSJM, 2019 WL 2025231, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 8, 
2019) (assuming director-defendants will bear the burden of demonstrating entire fairness and 
denying motion to dismiss). Even when a company has worked with investment bankers over a 
three-year period, contacted over a hundred potential buyers, and pursued more than one failed bid 
with third parties, it may not be able to show at the motion to dismiss stage that the common stock 
had no economic value before a merger in which the common shareholders received no 
consideration. See id. at *3, *13. 
335 See Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 127, at 3 (“[C]onflicts of interest are never very far 
away in a venture-backed company.”). 
336 See Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 129-34 (Del. 2016) (ruling in the context of public 
company Zynga, previously a venture-backed startup, that independence was lacking for one director 
because of her social tie of co-owning a private airplane with the company’s former CEO and 
controlling shareholder, and for two VC directors with a network of ongoing business relations with 
the same former officer and another board member). 
337 See supra note 274. 
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recognize that startups often have only one independent director, if any, 
available to serve on a special committee.338 
Therefore, the potential for bias and self-interest are significant, but the 
lack of independence or a special committee does not indicate a lack of good 
faith efforts to act in the best interest of the corporation. Shareholders have 
bargained for a different style of board governance. Startup boards have other 
process protections available, such as hiring an investment banker and doing 
a thorough market check. In some circumstances, disinterested shareholder 
approval is another possible process check.  
As the full range of process tools often will not be available in the startup 
context, future case law could more clearly shed light on which practices 
might be emphasized or adapted.339 Traditional notions of “fair process” and 
“fair dealing” could adjust to the startup environment, while still maintaining 
the essential role that fiduciary duties can serve to police bad faith, 
opportunistic conduct that harms corporate value. In turn, startup directors 
can also embrace the opportunity to improve corporate governance practices. 
At a certain point in a startup’s lifecycle, it becomes more realistic to expect 
a company to invest in financial and accounting systems, compliance controls, 
to recruit truly independent board members,340 and more generally to be 
mindful about building systems for accountability that promote long-term 
value creation and responsible business practices. 
CONCLUSION 
As large numbers of startups increasingly pursue growth and 
transformational technology while remaining private, they have come to 
represent an essential part of the economy and have a significant impact on 
employees, communities, and other stakeholders. It is time that far greater 
attention be devoted to understanding their internal dynamics and the 
recurring problems they face. 
This Article has provided a comprehensive, novel account of startup 
governance. It is a positive, descriptive framework, built from the ground up 
with an understanding of the evolving nature of the startup business and 
capital structure, driving the interrelated set of vertical and horizontal 
governance issues between all participants. Setting out this framework shows 
 
338 Delaware courts have applied a higher level of scrutiny to one-member special committees. 
Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
339 See Cable, supra note 326, at 45-48 (arguing that Delaware courts should provide “more 
clarity in defining the parameters of fairness review” for startups, “rooted in the practicalities of 
customary practice”). 
340 See Larcker & Tayan, supra note 242 (discussing the process by which pre-IPO companies 
develop reliable systems of corporate governance). 
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that startups are characterized by heterogeneous shareholders, overlapping 
governance roles, and dynamic change. 
This understanding offers important distinctions from prevailing models 
and paradigms and reveals a richer, more complicated set of conflicts and 
features. It explains the critical current issues of monitoring failures by 
startup boards and the governance complexity of extreme late-stage startups. 
Further, it provides the foundation for doctrinal change, showing that courts 
could adapt their application of longstanding corporate law principles to fit 
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